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TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW
Emma Kaufman*
It is a bedrock principle of American criminal law that the authority to try and
punish someone for a crime arises from the crime’s connection to a particular
place. Thus, we assume that a person who commits a crime in some location—
say, Philadelphia—can be arrested by Philadelphia police for conduct deemed
criminal by the Pennsylvania legislature, prosecuted in a Philadelphia court,
and punished in a Pennsylvania prison. The idea that criminal law is tied to
geography in this way is called the territoriality principle. This idea is so familiar that it usually goes unstated.
This Article foregrounds and questions the territoriality principle. Drawing on
a broad and eclectic set of sources, it argues that domestic criminal law is less
territorial than conventional wisdom holds. Although the territoriality principle is central to criminal law ideology, territorialism is a norm in decline. In
reality, over the past century, new doctrines and enforcement practices have
unmoored criminal law from geographic boundaries. The result is a criminal
legal system in which borders are negotiable and honored in the breach.
Scholars have largely overlooked the deterritorialization of domestic criminal
law, but the decline of the territoriality principle has striking implications. It
undermines constitutional doctrines and academic theories built on the classic
account of criminal law. It upsets foundational conceptual distinctions that
structure public law. And it raises normative questions about just how far
criminal laws should reach. This Article grapples with those questions and argues that borders are an underenforced constraint on the police power.
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INTRODUCTION
Twenty years ago, Dustin Higgs was sentenced to death in a federal court
in Maryland. 1 Federal law required Higgs to be executed “in the manner prescribed” by the state where he was tried. 2 But while Higgs was on death row,
Maryland abolished the death penalty. So prosecutors asked the court to designate Indiana, a state that permits capital punishment, as the site of Higgs’s
execution. 3 The trial court refused, but the Supreme Court intervened. 4 The
United States government put Dustin Higgs to death during an unprecedented “spree of executions,” four days before President Trump left office. 5
Eleven months later, it became a crime to mail abortion pills to Texas. 6
Under a new Texas law, a doctor in Vermont who prescribes two pills online

1. Higgs v. United States, 711 F. Supp. 2d 479, 493 (D. Md. 2010).
2. United States v. Higgs, 141 S. Ct. 645, 647–48 (2021) (mem.) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3596(a)).
3. Id. at 648; see also David Cole, A Rush to Execute, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Feb. 25, 2021),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2021/02/25/trump-supreme-court-execution-spree [perma.cc/
EXD2-TXYZ].
4. See Higgs, 141 S. Ct. at 645 (lifting the stay on Higgs’s execution).
5. Id. at 647 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[After Higgs’s execution,] the Federal Government will have executed more than three times as many people in the last six months than it had
in the previous six decades.”); see also Hailey Fuchs, U.S. Executes Dustin Higgs for Role in 3 1996
Murders, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/16/us/politics/dustinhiggs-executed.html [perma.cc/68S7-4XWJ].
6. See S. 4, 87th Leg., 2d. Spec. Sess. § 5(b)(1) (Tex. 2021).
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faces years in a Texas jail. 7 A Texas court can issue a warrant for that doctor’s
arrest, and the governor could seek the physician’s extradition. 8 The current
governor, Greg Abbott, hailed the statute as “a celebration of Texas values.” 9
A lobbyist behind the bill described it as an effort to ensure that Texas prosecutors can reach people “outside of the state’s strict limits.” 10
These stories seem to have little in common. But both challenge the intuition that criminal law is tied to a particular place. In the first case, the government selected Indiana as the right site to impose a punishment handed
down in Maryland. In the second, the Texas legislature criminalized conduct
across the country. These cases feel strange—legal, perhaps, but unconventional. To those trained in Anglo-American criminal law, it is odd to think
that a Texas criminal statute can reach Vermont and that a crime committed
in Maryland can result in an execution in Indiana, hundreds of miles and several states away.
These cases are unsettling because they conflict with a basic assumption
about how domestic criminal law works. It is a bedrock principle of American
criminal law that the authority to try and punish someone for a crime arises
from the crime’s connection to territory. Thus, we assume that a person who
commits a crime in some place—say, Philadelphia—can be arrested by Philadelphia police for conduct deemed criminal by the Pennsylvania legislature,
prosecuted in a Philadelphia court before a jury of Philadelphia residents, and
punished in a Pennsylvania prison. As a corollary, we also tend to assume that
Pennsylvania criminal law stops at the state’s borders and that Ohio courts
cannot apply Pennsylvania criminal law. 11

7. Id.; see also Anne Branigin, In Texas, Anyone Who Mails Abortion Pills Can Now Be
Sent to Jail, THE LILY (Dec. 7, 2021), https://www.thelily.com/in-texas-anyone-who-mailsabortion-pills-can-now-be-sent-to-jail [perma.cc/637D-4ATV]; Letter from Jerry McGinty, Director, Legis. Budget Bd. to Hon. Lois W. Kolkhorst, Chair, Senate Comm. Health & Hum. Servs.
(Aug. 8, 2021), https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/872/impactstmts/html/SB00004IB.htm [perma.cc
/GZ2S-NQGL].
8. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 51.13, § 22 (West 2015).
9. Branigin, supra note 7.
10. See Ashley Lopez, Prescribing Abortion Pills Online or Mailing Them in Texas Can
Now Land You in Jail, NPR (Dec. 6. 2021, 1:42 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2021/12/06/1060160624/prescribing-abortion-pills-online-or-mailing-them-in-texas-cannow-land-you-in-j [perma.cc/QML9-ZJ2D].
11. There are conceptual and technical differences between legislative jurisdiction to
criminalize conduct, judicial jurisdiction to try criminal cases, constitutional venue requirements, choice of law rules, and criminal law enforcement norms. These aspects of criminal jurisdiction need not run together: the geographic scope of the criminal law is a separate question
from which government’s law applies in a given criminal case; a legislature can have power a
court lacks; and so on. But as this Article explains, these distinctions are underappreciated and
undertheorized because the territoriality principle is so entrenched in Anglo-American criminal
law.
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The idea that criminal law is bound to geography in this way is called the
territoriality principle. 12 This idea is deeply embedded in American legal
thought. The Model Penal Code (MPC) cites the territoriality principle as a
“maxim of American jurisprudence” that differentiates criminal from civil
law. 13 Philosophers identify territoriality as one of the central tenets of criminal law in common law regimes. 14 Conflicts experts presume that criminal
laws are territorial and thus “obviously” fall outside their field. 15 Constitutional scholars describe the territorial approach to criminal law as a “very long
tradition” in American jurisprudence, 16 and the Supreme Court treats the territoriality of domestic criminal law as self-evident. 17 These sources rarely specify why criminal law is or must be territorial, 18 but they invoke territorialism
as a foundational and distinctive feature of domestic criminal law. Everyone
else simply assumes the territoriality principle. In practice, the idea that domestic criminal law is territorial is so familiar that it usually goes unstated.
This Article foregrounds and questions the territoriality principle. Drawing on a broad and eclectic set of sources—from penal codes and constitutional cases to private contracts, police manuals, interviews, and materials
obtained through open records requests—it argues that domestic criminal law
is less territorial than conventional wisdom holds. Territorialism is central to
criminal law ideology and a good deal of legal doctrine. But the territoriality
principle is a norm in decline.
In reality, over the past century, new laws and enforcement practices have
unmoored criminal law from geographic boundaries. This phenomenon has
unfolded at every phase of the criminal legal process, from criminalization to
punishment. Over time, legislatures have redefined crimes to stretch across
territorial borders; courts have expanded their own criminal jurisdiction and
recognized states’ authority to prosecute extraterritorial acts; police have
pooled their resources and formed interjurisdictional task forces; and prison
12. See R.A. DUFF, THE REALM OF CRIMINAL LAW 103–04 (2018); Lucia Zedner, Is the
Criminal Law Only for Citizens? A Problem at the Borders of Punishment, in THE BORDERS OF
PUNISHMENT 40, 46 (Katja Franko Aas & Mary Bosworth eds., 2013).
13. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 note (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
14. DUFF, supra note 12, at 106; see also Zedner, supra note 12, at 46; Lindsay Farmer,
Territorial Jurisdiction and Criminalization, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 225, 230 n.14 (2013); Kimberly
Kessler Ferzan, The Reach of the Realm, 14 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 335, 336 (2020).
15. HERMA HILL KAY, LARRY KRAMER, KERMIT ROOSEVELT & DAVID L. FRANKLIN,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 84–85 (10th ed. 2018).
16. Rick Hills, Will (Should) Congress Use Its FF&C “Effects” Power to Regulate Post-Roe
“Abortion Tourism”?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Dec. 6, 2021, 3:14 PM), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2021/12/will-should-congress-use-its-ffc-effects-power-to-regulate-post-roe-abortion-tourism.html [perma.cc/4F2L-KMGZ] (discussing “the very long tradition of states[] using
the law of the place of alleged offense to govern crimes”).
17. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 823–24 (1975) (stating that Virginia’s legislature “obviously” could not criminalize abortion in New York or “prosecute [its residents] for
going there”).
18. Philosophers of criminal law are an exception. See supra note 14; see also Gideon
Yaffe, Punishing Non-citizens, 14 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 347, 350 (2020).
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superintendents have agreed to trade prisoners between states. 19 The result is
a legal system in which state criminal law exceeds state borders. In some cases,
criminal law need not be territorial at all.
Legal scholars have largely overlooked these developments. But the decline of the territoriality principle has striking implications. As a matter of
doctrine, the shift away from territorialism upsets legal rules built on the classic account of criminal law. The claim that domestic criminal law is territorial
runs throughout substantive criminal law and constitutional jurisprudence.
The territoriality principle shapes federalism and criminal procedure doctrine
and surfaces in everything from habeas and abstention cases to Commerce
Clause disputes. 20 The erosion of territorialism makes these lines of doctrine
feel anachronistic and strained.
At a more practical level, the evolution of criminal jurisdiction creates
basic good governance concerns. As this Article explains, the territoriality
principle receded over the course of the twentieth century as police and prison
officials began to enter private agreements—contracts, compacts, memoranda
of understanding—that extend the reach of criminal laws. These agreements
effectively rewrite the borders of domestic criminal law. Their proliferation
raises pressing questions about transparency in criminal law enforcement.
The decline of territorialism also has broad theoretical implications. Although it is rarely discussed, the territoriality principle plays a critical role in
defining and legitimating criminal law. In treatises and legal opinions, territoriality is understood as a unique feature of domestic criminal law—a background principle that distinguishes the field from both civil and international
law. 21 On the standard account, domestic criminal law takes a more territorial
approach to jurisdiction than international criminal law, and criminal law’s
commitment to territorialism explains why choice of law exists in only the
civil domain. 22 In theory, territorialism also helps to justify sanctions imposed
in the name of “the people.” 23
If territorialism is receding, these claims make less sense. If, as this Article
shows, domestic criminal law contains nonterritorial theories of jurisdiction
and the administration of criminal law blurs territorial boundaries, then criminal law is not so different from other fields. And if criminal law is not distinctive, it is difficult to explain some of the more peculiar aspects of our criminal
legal system. Without territorialism, for example, it is hard to understand the
prohibition on choice of criminal law and the presumption that state criminal
law stops at state lines. It also becomes trickier (even more impossible than it

19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Section I.D.
21. See infra Section I.A.
22. See infra Sections I.A, III.A.
23. See infra Section III.B (exploring the relationship between territorialism and the claim
that criminal law is a form of public law in which prosecutors represent “the people”).
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already is) to defend penal sanctions. To echo Professor Richard Ford, if criminal jurisdiction is not territorial, “all that is solid melts into air.” 24
That insight, in turn, opens up some interesting questions about whether
territorialism is good for criminal law. This Article’s basic thesis is that the
borders of domestic criminal law are up for grabs. Questions of criminal jurisdiction are much more contested and flexible than many scholars and critics of American criminal justice seem to have realized. Recognizing this fact
reveals some provocative possibilities for criminal justice reform, such as redistricting police forces, regionalizing criminal lawmaking, and permitting
criminal defendants to forum shop. The erosion of territorialism has the potential to transform the design and administration of criminal law.
Yet, at the same time, the story outlined below should give reformers
pause. The decline of the territoriality principle has not been a boon for criminal defendants. On the contrary, one of this Article’s core lessons is that the
erosion of territorialism has empowered police, prosecutors, and prison wardens, who have benefited from growing flexibility about the outer boundaries
of their authority. The history of criminal jurisdiction demonstrates that, although they are fraught and arbitrary, borders are a crucial restraint on the
police power. 25 Those concerned about abuse of power in the criminal justice
system might then want to revive territorialism rather than embrace its decline. Animated by that concern, this Article makes a case for more territorialism in American criminal law.
This argument proceeds in three Parts. Part I defines the territoriality
principle and traces its history. At first, it is unclear why so many authoritative
sources seem to believe that domestic criminal law has to be territorial. Part I
sets out to answer that question. It locates the origins of the territoriality principle in substantive criminal law, constitutional law, and the institutional design of the criminal justice system.
Part II documents territorialism’s decline over the course of the twentieth
century. Bringing together a wide variety of sources, Part II depicts a criminal
justice system that has been deterritorialized in two respects. First, courts have
embraced nonterritorial conceptions of criminal jurisdiction—holding, for
example, that states can predicate their criminal laws on citizenship rather
than presence on state soil. 26 Second, the administration of criminal law has
become more centralized and collaborative. Together, these trends have produced a legal regime that is less territorial than one might expect, and, where

24. Richard T. Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843, 851
(1999); cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 4, sc. 1; KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS,
THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (Samuel Moore trans., Penguin Classics 2002) (1848).
25. By police power, I mean the amorphous and supposedly inherent power of a government—in the United States, state governments—to secure social order, including by using actual
police to enforce criminal laws. For a history of the term, see MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE
POWER (2005). See also Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 854 (2014) (contrasting states’ “police power” and the federal government’s limited, enumerated powers).
26. See, e.g., Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73–77 (1941); see also infra Section II.A.
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it remains tied to geography, is much less wedded to state borders than one
steeped in doctrine and rhetoric about American criminal law would imagine.
Part III explores the implications of this account. It begins by explaining
how the deterritorialization of criminal law undermines doctrines and conceptual distinctions that separate criminal law from other fields. Part III then
turns to the normative questions implicit in the erosion of the territoriality
principle. In the end, the Article offers a defense of territorial jurisdiction.
Its real aim, though, is to demonstrate that the territoriality principle is
worth debating. At its heart, this is a piece about the importance of criminal
jurisdiction. Scholars and students of American law tend to think that the
study of jurisdiction is technical and dry, or as Professor William Prosser put
it in 1953, “a dismal swamp” inhabited by “eccentric professors who theorize
about mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensible jargon.” 27 Perhaps it is unsurprising, then, that there has been little scholarship on territoriality in domestic criminal law. 28 American criminal law textbooks omit
jurisdiction, and the leading article on the topic remains a piece published in
1926. 29 In the meantime, criminal law scholars have turned their attention toward the political incentives and institutional dynamics that make the country’s criminal justice system so harsh and indefensible. 30
But the territoriality principle persists in doctrine, theory, and ideology
about criminal law, and it plays a pivotal role in justifying the power to punish.
In other areas of law, academics are having lively debates about the merits and
drawbacks of territorialism. Scholars of constitutional law, federal courts, civil

27. LEA BRILMAYER, JACK GOLDSMITH, ERIN O’HARA O’CONNOR & CARLOS M.
VÁZQUEZ, CONFLICT OF LAWS, at xxiv (8th ed. 2020) (quoting William L. Prosser, Interstate
Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953)).
28. There is a very small body of early- and mid-twentieth century writing on territoriality
in criminal law. See, e.g., Albert Levitt, Jurisdiction over Crimes (pt. 1), 16 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 316 (1925) [hereinafter Levitt I]; Albert Levitt, Jurisdiction over Crimes (pt. 2),
16 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 495 (1926) [hereinafter Levitt II]; Daniel L. Rotenberg,
Extraterritorial Legislative Jurisdiction and the State Criminal Law, 38 TEX. L. REV. 763 (1960);
Robert A. Leflar, Conflict of Laws: Choice of Law in Criminal Cases, 25 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 44
(1974); Wendell Berge, Criminal Jurisdiction and the Territorial Principle, 30 MICH. L. REV. 238
(1931). There is also a larger and more recent body of literature on territoriality in adjacent fields
like conflict of laws and immigration law, and in the last decade philosophers of criminal law
(particularly in Europe) have grown increasingly interested in the scope of legislative criminal
jurisdiction. See infra Sections I.A, II, III.B. But scholarship on this topic remains rare and almost
none since the 1970s has examined how the territoriality principle works (or fails to work) in the
United States. As Professor Markus Dubber observed in 2013, “Despite the recent upsurge of
interest in criminal jurisdiction in the international sphere, domestic criminal jurisdiction remains understudied. This is a shame . . . .” Markus D. Dubber, Criminal Jurisdiction and Conceptions of Penality in Comparative Perspective, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 247, 247 (2013).
29. Levitt II, supra note 28; see Leflar, supra note 28, at 44; see also, e.g., SANFORD H.
KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & RACHEL E. BARKOW, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES
(10th ed. 2017).
30. This literature is vast. For two examples, see JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING
THROUGH CRIME (2007), and WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE (2011).
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procedure, immigration law, international law, and conflicts have all asked
whether the law they study is (or should be) based on a territorial theory of
state power. 31 Criminal law scholars have said less about this question. Yet the
shift away from territorialism is no less evident in criminal law, and it may
even be more destabilizing to the field.
Moreover, this seemingly obscure topic has serious stakes. The decline of
the territoriality principle is why Dustin Higgs could be executed in Indiana.32
It is why Texas can criminalize prescriptions written in Vermont. 33 It is also—
to use a looming example—why it is less clear than one might think whether
Missouri can ban its residents from getting abortions outside the state now
that the Supreme Court has overturned Roe v. Wade. 34 The legal system’s waning commitment to territorialism raises disquieting questions about the limits
of criminal law.
I.

THE ORIGINS OF THE TERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE

The territoriality principle is so entrenched in domestic criminal law as to
feel unremarkable. It is uncontroversial to think that a crime committed in
Maine will be policed, prosecuted, and punished in Maine. This Part asks why
this approach to criminal law seems straightforward—how, in other words,
the conventional wisdom came to be.

31. See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? (2009) (constitutional law); Stephen E. Sachs, The Unlimited Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 106 VA. L.
REV. 1703 (2020) (federal courts); Linda Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the Rights
of Immigrants, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 389 (2007) (immigration law); Cedric Ryngaert,
Territorial Jurisdiction over Cross-Frontier Offences: Revisiting a Classic Problem of International
Criminal Law, 9 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 187 (2009) (international law); Michael H. Hoffheimer, The
Case Against Neo-Territorialism, 95 TUL. L. REV. 1305, 1306 (2021) (civil procedure); Douglas
Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice
of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 317 (1992) (conflicts).
32. See United States v. Higgs, 141 S. Ct. 645, 647–48 (2021) (mem.) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
33. See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77 (1941); Higgs, 141 S. Ct. at 648–49 (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting). There are of course more technical legal explanations for these cases. (Higgs’s
case, for example, turned on interpretation of the Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3596(a)). But as this Article explains, the statutes and doctrines that permit the sort of displacement involved in extending Texas criminal law to cover conduct in Vermont or redesignating a
federal sentence imposed in Maryland to permit an execution in Indiana developed from the
deterritorialization of criminal law. To come into existence, these statutes and doctrines required
a basic shift in how the American legal system approaches criminal jurisdiction. This Article
documents that shift.
34. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022) (overruling Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). To be clear, there are compelling—in my view, winning—arguments that states cannot prohibit out-of-state abortions, whether or not criminal jurisdiction is
territorial. Legal scholars have argued that extraterritorial regulation of abortion is impermissible under a standard conflicts analysis. See infra note 295. Scholars have also explored constitutional limits on such laws. See infra note 148. The point here is simply that the decline of
territorialism has unsettled a theory of criminal jurisdiction that would provide an easy resolution to questions about the ambit of state criminal law.
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Before beginning, it is helpful to introduce my key term. As I explain below, the territoriality principle is a shorthand for two ideas: first, that a government’s power to define and punish crime arises from its authority over a
bounded geographic region; and second, that criminal laws apply to any person within that region. The territoriality principle is thus a claim about both
the source and the subjects of criminal law. In a territorial criminal law regime,
governments with legally defined borders have authority to criminalize conduct within those borders. That authority extends to anyone who is physically
present, regardless of her personal traits or place of residence.
Accordingly, it undermines the territoriality principle for state legislatures to criminalize out-of-state conduct. It would also offend the territoriality
principle to apply criminal laws only to citizens or residents and not, for instance, to noncitizens and visitors. In the first example, the government extends the reach of criminal law beyond its borders. In the second, the
government predicates criminal law on legal status rather than presence on
state soil. 35
This Article is interested in both kinds of violations of the territoriality
norm because both upend traditional assumptions about how domestic criminal law works. My basic claim is that criminal law has become less territorial
over time—more expansive, more flexible, and more receptive to forms of jurisdiction based on identity rather than geography. To understand why this
development is notable, it helps to begin by asking why territorialism has so
much purchase in the classic account of criminal law.
A. Criminal Law
Territorial borders are built into the definitions of American criminal law.
In the first weeks of law school, students learn that a crime is an act that happens in a given place as a result of voluntary bodily movement. 36 This axiom,
known as the voluntary act requirement, embeds a “where” question in the
foundation of criminal law. To know that a crime occurred, one must decide

35. Territorial borders are themselves sources of legal status. (For example, citizenship
status flows from the territorial concept of a bordered nation.) See generally Ford, supra note 24,
at 858. My assertion is not that territorialism is status-neutral but rather that there is a basic
distinction between territorial legal systems, in which law attaches by virtue of physical presence,
and nonterritorial regimes, in which law attaches by virtue of some other trait (such as membership in a group) and follows a person as she travels. Part III explores this distinction in more
detail.
36. See, e.g., KADISH ET AL. supra note 29, at 221–27.
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where the salient conduct—the actus reus—took place. This is why courts describe venue as “a necessary, if often subtle, element of every criminal statute.” 37 At its core, crime is an idea tied to a location. 38
Traditionally, the relevant location of a crime is a legally defined territory
whose political body has deemed the action criminal. Stating this principle out
loud makes it sound complicated, but the idea is familiar. When I commit an
assault in Battery Park, what matters is that I am in New York because states
define and prosecute assaults. (One could make the same point about federal
crimes or city ordinances. The observation is simply that the ambit of domestic criminal law is territorial, and territories have formal legal boundaries.) In
other words, when defining crimes, American criminal law generally cares
about where you are rather than who you are. The relevant fact is that you are
on New York land, not that you are an American citizen, a New York citizen,
a senior citizen, or a person who identifies as female, Black, or Jewish. And
because of the way criminal law has developed in the United States, the operative “where” is most often the state. Thus, the Model Penal Code provides
that criminal law typically extends to any offense committed “within the
[s]tate.” 39
The territorial scope of criminal law is supposed to be one of the things
that makes it distinctive. In a section of the Model Penal Code called “territorial applicability,” the MPC’s reporters explain that criminal law is fundamentally different from civil law because in the criminal context, “jurisdiction and
choice of law . . . are merged.” 40 Again, the principle sounds tricky but feels
simple. In a New York criminal court, New York criminal law applies.
Whereas in civil actions a court can apply a sister state’s rules, in criminal
court the forum state’s law governs. 41 A New York judge cannot choose to
apply Connecticut criminal law to your case even if you live in Connecticut or
planned your crime there. No, the MPC tells us, “it has long been a maxim of

37. United States v. Lewis, 768 F.3d 1086, 1089 (10th Cir. 2014). Appellate courts disagree
about whether venue must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Compare United States v.
Lopez, 880 F.3d 974, 982 (8th Cir. 2018) (“Proof of venue is an essential element of the Government’s case . . . .” (quoting United States v. Netz, 758 F.2d 1308, 1312 (8th Cir. 1985)), with
United States v. Romans, 823 F.3d 299, 309 (5th Cir. 2016) (“This Circuit has not treated territorial jurisdiction and venue as ‘essential elements’ in the sense that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is required.” (quoting United States v. White, 611 F.2d 531, 536 (5th Cir. 1980)). But the
basic point—that the site of a crime is part of its definition, necessary to prosecution in any
jurisdiction—is consistent across circuits.
38. See MICHAEL HIRST, JURISDICTION AND THE AMBIT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 2 (2003)
(“[I]ssues that criminal lawyers generally classify as ‘matters of jurisdiction’ . . . as if they were
merely concerned with the powers or competence of the court, should properly be considered
as elements relating to the actus reus itself.”).
39. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962); see infra Section II.A (exploring exceptions to “strict territoriality”).
40. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 explanatory note (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft
1962).
41. Farmer, supra note 14, at 230 n.14 (“[W]hile the civil courts will on occasion seek to
apply foreign law, criminal courts can only ever apply domestic law, the law of the territory.”).
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American jurisprudence that a state will not enforce the penal laws of another
state.” 42 So if you committed your crime in New York, you are prosecuted
there. And if you committed a crime in Connecticut and drove to New York,
you must go back to Connecticut to be prosecuted in the right place.
Conflicts scholars call the prohibition on interstate enforcement of criminal laws “the public law taboo.” 43 The intuition driving this taboo is that there
is something special about public law, and “penal” law in particular, that
makes it offensive and illegitimate to apply a criminal law outside the place it
was enacted. It is not entirely clear why penal law is so special—why, for instance, it is more problematic for a state to impose another state’s criminal
rules than its civil rules. The answer seems to lie in deeply held (if not especially concrete) beliefs about criminal law’s relationship to concepts like sovereignty and democracy. Later Sections of this Article elaborate and question
those beliefs. 44 For now, the critical point is that criminal law is supposed to
be territorial in ways that civil law is not.
To be more precise, domestic criminal law is supposed to be territorial.
When it comes to international law, scholars and courts have long recognized
several bases for criminal jurisdiction, including forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction in which nations can criminalize conduct by and against their citizens abroad. 45 For international law scholars, it is not unusual in the least to
think that criminal law could be pegged to a personal trait like citizenship status rather than to the place the crime was committed. That idea is also familiar
to those who prosecute federal crimes such as terrorism and human traffick-

42. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962); see also KAY
ET AL., supra note 15, at 84 (tracing this maxim to “Chief Justice Marshall’s unsupported dictum”

about the law of nations in The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825)); see infra note 278
(discussing The Antelope’s importation into domestic criminal law).
43. William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 161 (2002). As
Dodge notes, the “phrase is Andreas Lowenfeld’s.” Id. at 161 n.4; see also Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
Public Law in the International Arena: Conflict of Laws, International Law, and Some Suggestions
for Their Interaction, 163 COLLECTED COURSES HAGUE ACAD. INT’L L. 311, 322–26 (1979); KAY
ET AL., supra note 15, at 84–85 (discussing the scope of the “so-called penal law exception” and
stating in passing that “criminal laws obviously qualify” and are therefore unenforceable outside
the jurisdiction that enacted the law). When discussing the public law taboo, conflicts scholars
usually refer to “public law” generally, not to choice of criminal law in particular. My invocation
of the taboo is an effort to apply ideas from a field focused on civil litigation to criminal law
theory. Robert Leflar made a similar move in 1974. See Leflar, supra note 28, at 44 (“Conflict of
laws treatises and casebooks usually omit material on choice of law in the criminal law field
almost altogether. They take up conflicts problems as though they arose only in civil litigation.”).
This blind spot in conflicts scholarship is a testament to the territoriality principle’s hold on
criminal law.
44. See infra Section III.B. See generally Dodge, supra note 43, at 164 (challenging the
rationales for the public law taboo).
45. See CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 104–10 (2d ed. 2015)
(discussing active and passive personality jurisdiction); Florian Jeßberger, A Short History of Jurisdiction in Transnational Criminal Law, in HISTORIES OF TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 261
(Neil Boister, Sabine Gless & Florian Jeßberger eds., 2021).
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ing, which often involve extraterritorial conduct and out-of-country defendants. 46 Territoriality is one option among many for international law theorists
and national security lawyers.
But when it comes to the criminal law that governs conduct in the United
States—the criminal law under which tens of millions of state prosecutions
proceed each year—territorialism is entrenched and rarely questioned. As the
Introduction noted, criminal law textbooks omit jurisdiction. 47 When the subject is discussed, territoriality is understood to be the prevailing rule. In 1909,
the Supreme Court announced without fanfare that an act “done within the
territorial limits of [one state] . . . cannot be prosecuted and punished by [another state].”48 A century later, criminal law philosophers describe territoriality as the principle “we currently observe,” 49 a central tenet in “classic[]
accounts [of] domestic criminal law,” 50 and a norm that distinguishes criminal
from international law, a field in which ideas about jurisdiction are more varied and flexible. 51 A commitment to the territoriality principle is thus thought
to be what makes domestic criminal law both domestic and criminal.
To be clear, the territoriality principle is neither a settled doctrine nor an
absolute rule. Cases and treatises on criminal law never quite specify what sort
of law territoriality is—a doctrine, a practice, or simply an assumption. (This
Article is one attempt to solve that mystery.) There are also recognized exceptions to the territoriality principle in state criminal law. The Model Penal Code
acknowledges that states can criminalize out-of-state conduct that affects their
“legitimate interests,” and the MPC’s reporters take pains to note that the
Code sets “forth a number of alternative bases for jurisdiction, thus rejecting
the old common law doctrines of strict territoriality.” 52 But most of those exceptions are territoriality adjacent; the MPC imagines, for example, criminalizing out-of-state conspiracies that involve an overt act “within the State.”53
These are, moreover, exceptions to a baseline rule that domestic criminal law

46. See, e.g., Michael Farbiarz, Accuracy and Adjudication: The Promise of Extraterritorial
Due Process, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 625, 625 (2016) (discussing federal terrorism and drug prosecutions). Scholars of Roman and German law would also find membership-based jurisdiction
familiar. See, e.g., Dubber, supra note 28, at 268 (German criminal law); Rollin M. Perkins, The
Territorial Principle in Criminal Law, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1155 (1971) (Roman criminal law).
47. See, e.g., KADISH ET AL., supra note 29.
48. Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315, 321 (1909).
49. Ferzan, supra note 14, at 336 (comparing extraterritorial bases for international criminal jurisdiction to “the territorial boundaries we currently observe” in domestic criminal law);
see, e.g., DUFF, supra note 12, at 103 (noting, in a discussion of criminal law, that “ambit and
jurisdiction are typically defined in territorial terms”).
50. Zedner, supra note 12, at 46.
51. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
52. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(1)(f) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
53. Id. § 1.03(1)(c).
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is territorial. That rule guides the MPC and explains the strong presumption
against extraterritoriality when interpreting state criminal statutes. 54
The idea, in short, is that paradigmatic criminal law—the stuff taught in
first-year criminal law classrooms—is territorial. Much of this Article is devoted to challenging that idea, to exploring when state criminal law fails to be
territorial and how the deterritorialization of domestic law undermines claims
about the distinctiveness of criminal law and its special relationship to democracy. These critiques make more sense and land harder if one pauses at the
outset to observe just how ingrained territorialism is in Anglo-American
criminal law, and state criminal law in particular. On the conventional account, the relationship between criminal law and territory is uncomplicated.
Extraterritorial criminal law is exceptional and technical, the sort of material
one learns in upper-level courses and specialist subjects like international or
national security law. And territorialism is the characteristic that makes criminal law identifiable as a form of domestic (rather than international), criminal
(rather than civil), and public (rather than private) law.
B. Constitutional Law
One finds a similar commitment to the territoriality principle in American constitutional law. The federal Constitution contains several provisions
that appear to require criminal law to be territorial. The two most obvious are
the Venue Clause in Article III, which fixes the place of criminal trials “in the
State where the said Crimes shall have been committed,” 55 and the Vicinage
Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which requires juries to be drawn from “the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” 56 There are
distinctions between these two provisions: venue is the location of a criminal
trial; vicinage is the catchment area for the jury. 57 But the clauses are related
conceptually and historically, and both are responsible for the strong strain of
territorialism that runs through American criminal law.
The Venue Clause was a response to British laws that permitted colonists
to be transported to England—“3,000 miles to an alien environment”—for
criminal trials. 58 In a magisterial article published in 1976, Professor Drew

54. See William S. Dodge, Presumptions Against Extraterritoriality in State Law, 53 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1389, 1391, 1412 (2020) (noting that “[s]tate rules on extraterritoriality . . . differ
from the federal presumption” and citing the California Supreme Court’s assumption that a state
dram shop law could have no extraterritorial effect because it was “a criminal statute”).
55. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. This rule applies except in cases of impeachment or
when a crime is “not committed within any State.” Id.
56. Id. amend. VI.
57. Drew L. Kershen, Vicinage (pt. 1), 29 OKLA. L. REV. 801, 805 (1976) [hereinafter
Kershen I]; see also Drew L. Kershen, Vicinage (pt. 2), 30 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 150 (1977) [hereinafter
Kershen II]. Kershen’s article was published across two volumes of the Oklahoma Law Review.
See also Scott Kafker, Comment, The Right to Venue and the Right to an Impartial Jury: Resolving
the Conflict in the Federal Constitution, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 729 n.2 (1985).
58. Kershen I, supra note 57, at 806, 809.
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Kershen explained that the Constitution’s authors adopted the Venue Clause
with two ideas in mind. First, the Founders believed that limiting venue would
protect defendants because the “legal and moral support” necessary to mount
a defense was most readily available close to home. 59 Second, and more fundamentally, the drafters espoused a common law theory of criminal jurisdiction in which courts may “enforce criminal laws only with respect to crimes
committed within the territory assigned to the court.” 60
Under this common law theory, venue (the place of a criminal trial) and
jurisdiction (the power to hear a criminal case) were one and the same. Courts
had no authority to enforce the criminal laws of another place, so of course
criminal trials would be held within a court’s territory. This understanding of
criminal law—in which venue and jurisdiction are merged—is what early
Americans meant when they described criminal law as “local.” 61 To say that
criminal law was local was not merely to recount a fact about criminal adjudication. Calling criminal law local was a claim about the source and limits of
judicial power.
The Founders expected that the twin goals of the Venue Clause—protecting defendants and constitutionalizing territorial jurisdiction—would align.
Because people usually committed crimes near their homes, 62 the Constitution’s authors assumed that tying venue to the site of a crime would have the
incidental benefit of protecting criminal defendants. But when that assumption faltered, the Founders chose territoriality as the touchstone of the Venue
Clause. 63 Rather than linking venue to a defendant’s residence, the drafters
tied venue to the crime’s location. The theory behind this choice was that the
government’s authority to enforce criminal laws arises from a power of selfdetermination that starts and stops at territorial borders—that is, from sovereignty. 64 From this perspective, the choice between tying venue to a defendant’s residence and predicating venue on a crime’s situs was no choice at all.
Venue had to track the crime because the government’s power to enforce
criminal law flowed from territory, not from facts about the defendant. 65
The Venue Clause thus constitutionalized territorialism. The Vicinage
Clause did too, though in slightly different ways. The Sixth Amendment’s vicinage requirement began as a proposed amendment to the text of the Constitution, which James Madison introduced to the House in 1789. 66 Madison’s

59. Id. at 808.
60. Id. at 811 (citing debates at the Constitutional Convention).
61. Id. at 811 & n.27.
62. See id. (noting, based on a review of constitutional debates, that the Venue Clause’s
drafters expected that the site of a “crime and the residence of the accused would ordinarily
coincide”).
63. Id.
64. Id.; see also infra Section III.B.1 (defining and critiquing the concept of sovereignty).
65. Kershen II, supra note 57, at 150 (“[A]n accused’s place of residence is irrelevant under the Constitution.”).
66. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
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proposal would have replaced Article III’s Venue Clause with language requiring trials before a jury “of the vicinage” in the county where the crime occurred, except when insurrectionists controlled that county (in which case the
trial could be moved nearby). 67 This proposal morphed several times during
the First Congress and ultimately landed in the Bill of Rights rather than Article III. 68 At a pivotal moment in the process, the Senate rejected the term
“vicinage” on the ground that it was “either too vague or too strict” 69—too
vague because it did not refer to a “particular geographical territory recognized as a political or governmental unit,” 70 and too strict because it might
require trials to be held in rebellious counties where juries would not convict. 71
The dispute over the word “vicinage” is illuminating. Supporters of the
vicinage provision liked the idea that vicinage could mean “neighborhood” or
“community,” loose concepts that captured a preference for localism and a
belief that juries were “the conscience of the community” and had a substantive role to play in interpreting criminal laws. 72 Opponents of the word “vicinage”—the Federalists—were worried about national uniformity and local
rebellions, so they wanted a clear term that would not require “neighborhood”
juries in every case. 73 The final language of the Sixth Amendment was a negotiated settlement between these camps. The Amendment requires juries to be
drawn from the “State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law.” 74

67. Kershen I, supra note 57, at 820; Kershen II, supra note 57, at 129 (quoting Madison’s
proposal).
68. Kershen I, supra note 57, at 821–22 (explaining that before the proposed amendment
to the Venue Clause went to the Senate, the House voted “to submit the propositions to the
Senate as a Bill of Rights, rather than as amendments which would be inserted at the appropriate
place in the body of the Federal Constitution”).
69. Id. at 822 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Sept. 23, 1789),
in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 424 & n.1 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904)).
70. Id. at 823.
71. Id. at 824 (quoting Power of the Judiciary (June 20, 1788), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 216, 224 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904).); see also Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct.
1390, 1400 n.40 (2020) (“In private writings, Madison . . . explain[ed] some of the Senate’s objections with his original phrasing of the vicinage requirement.”).
72. Kershen I, supra note 57, at 823, 833–36.
73. Id. at 823–24.
74. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Section 29 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which implemented
the Sixth Amendment and established the first judicial districts, created an exception for capital
cases: it required trials for crimes punishable by death to be in the county where the crime was
committed unless “great inconvenience” would occur, in which case the trial could be moved.
However, at least twelve jurors still had to “be summoned from thence.” Judiciary Act of 1789,
ch. 20, § 29, 1 Stat. 73, 88. This provision preserved the narrower “right to trial by a jury of the
vicinage as at common law” for capital crimes. Kershen I, supra note 57, at 854; see also Charles
Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 105
(1923). But it became dead letter—courts routinely found “great inconvenience”—and was repealed in the 1862 Amendments to the Judiciary Act. Kershen II, supra note 57, at 55–61.
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This rule retains and entrenches a basic form of territorialism: it makes
the site of a crime the threshold issue when determining the proper criminal
procedure. But the Sixth Amendment calls for juries from “states” and “districts” rather than the “vicinage.” 75 The final vicinage provision is thus not
really a vicinage provision. Instead, it summons juries from formal political
units with legally defined boundaries, and it refers to districts “ascertained by
law,” a phrase that empowers the legislature to determine the jury’s geographic origins within a state. In this respect, the Sixth Amendment was a significant grant of discretion to Congress. 76 The Amendment also represented
the triumph of legal notions of jurisdiction—and Anglo-American legal definitions of territory77—over looser and more longstanding conceptions of political community.
One could go on at some length here. The subsequent history of the venue
and vicinage provisions is interesting, not least because it involves protracted
disputes about what happens to criminal jurisdiction78 and federal juries 79
when Congress tinkers with the boundaries of judicial districts. Part II explores some of that history. Most notably, it examines the emergence in the
twentieth century of the idea that jurisdiction and venue are distinct such that
the location of a criminal trial is a waivable right possessed by the defendant
rather than a structural requirement for the legitimacy of criminal adjudication. 80 As Part II explains, the fracturing of jurisdiction and venue marks an
important moment in the deterritorialization of American criminal law. 81
But at this stage, that history is a detour from the core point: the commitment to territorialism in American criminal law can be traced to the U.S. Constitution. The creators of the federal Constitution treated criminal law as
territorial when they debated and drafted the rules on criminal trials. As a result, courts have understood it to be a problem of constitutional significance
when a crime is tried outside the place it was committed. 82 The claim here is
75. See U.S. CONST. amend VI.
76. Kershen II, supra note 57, at 46. Note, however, that the borders of federal judicial
districts coincided with state borders at the time the Sixth Amendment was enacted, so at first
the Amendment simply required what the Venue Clause already did—namely, trial within the
state. Id.
77. See generally GREGORY ABLAVSKY, FEDERAL GROUND (2021).
78. Kershen II, supra note 57, at 3–6 (collecting cases on whether the subdivision of judicial districts limited federal courts’ criminal jurisdiction to events that occurred within a particular division, a question the Supreme Court answered in the negative in three cases decided in
the 1890s). As Part II explains, these late-nineteenth-century cases created a new distinction between venue and jurisdiction.
79. See id. at 46–50, 67–68 (tracing the development of vicinage doctrine, which—in
broad strokes—affirms judicial discretion to summon the jury from anywhere the court chooses
so long as it is within the judicial district).
80. See infra Part II.
81. Id.
82. See Kershen II, supra note 57, at 3–8 (collecting cases on the constitutionality of criminal proceedings held outside the original judicial district where a crime occurred). One might
cite any constitutional case alleging improper venue here too.
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not that it is unconstitutional to try crimes extraterritorially. The whole purpose of this Article is to show that the legality of extraterritorial criminal law
has shifted over time. Rather, the observation is that we tend to think domestic
criminal law is territorial because the Constitution’s drafters assumed it had
to be.
State constitutions contain the same background assumption. The Sixth
Amendment vicinage right is one of the few that is not incorporated, 83 but
most state constitutions have Sixth Amendment analogues that build territoriality into the criminal legal process. 84 Montana, for example, requires criminal trials to be held in “the county or district” where the crime occurred,
before a jury from the same area. 85 Massachusetts limits criminal prosecutions
to “the vicinity where [the facts] happen.” 86 In Louisiana, criminal trials must
be in the “parish where the offense or an element of the offense occurred.” 87
There are distinctions between these provisions, but they all reflect and reinforce a territorial understanding of criminal law. When searching for the origins of the territoriality principle, constitutional rules on criminal trials prove
to be a critical source.
Territorialism appears in other parts of the federal Constitution too. The
Extradition Clause obliges states to “deliver[] up” alleged criminals who “flee
from Justice.” 88 This Clause, which immediately prompted disputes about the
rendition of fugitive slaves, 89 requires interstate cooperation in criminal law
enforcement. More to the point, it presumes that cooperation means sending
fugitives back rather than trying them in the state where they are found. One
could imagine a legal regime in which states authorized each other to enforce
83. See, e.g., Caudill v. Scott, 857 F.2d 344, 345 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he term ‘district’ as
used in the Sixth Amendment ha[s] never been defined to apply to states . . . .”); Zicarelli v. Dietz,
633 F.2d 312, 325–26 (3d Cir. 1980) (“[W]e conclude that the provision of the Sixth Amendment
providing for the right to have a jury from a district ‘previously ascertained by law’ applies only
to federal criminal trials, and not to state criminal trials.”); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS 275 (1998) (arguing against “mechanical incorporation” of the vicinage requirement). But see Steven A. Engel, The Public’s Vicinage Right: A Constitutional Argument, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1658, 1706–07 (2000) (“The Supreme Court has not determined the extent to
which the Sixth Amendment Vicinage Clause is incorporated . . . . The arguments that the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate the Vicinage Clause are particularly unconvincing.”).
84. Leflar, supra note 28, at 46. Leflar draws on and cites Albert Levitt’s 1925 article, Jurisdiction over Crimes, which catalogued state venue and vicinage requirements, “[f]ew if any of
[which] have changed.” Id.; see also Levitt I, supra note 28, at 331–35.
85. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 24; see also Levitt I, supra note 28, at 331 n.46 (counting eight
states with identical clauses and more with similar provisions).
86. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XIII.
87. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 16.
88. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (implementing the Extradition
Clause); UNIF. CRIM. EXTRADITION ACT (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1936) (model extradition statute).
The UCEA has been adopted by every state except Mississippi and South Carolina. Utt v. Warden, 427 A.2d 1092, 1096 n.6 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981).
89. See Ariela Gross & David R. Upham, Article IV, Section 2: Movement of Persons
Throughout the Union, NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/article-iv/clauses/37 [perma.cc/87DS-4STD].
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their criminal codes—so, for example, Georgia would say, “Massachusetts, try
that defendant for me,” rather than, “Send him back to my criminal courts.”
But that is not how the U.S. Constitution works. Because early Americans had
sharp disagreements over the criminal laws used to regulate slavery, 90 and because the Founders assumed the common law conception of criminal jurisdiction, 91 the Constitution provides for extradition. As a result, when people
“flee from Justice,” 92 we ship them back to the place where justice is supposed
to happen.
American courts have also read territorialism into the Due Process
Clause. 93 In cases involving crimes that cross state lines—for example, a crossborder shooting or a theft in one state where stolen goods wind up in another—courts have suggested that the Due Process Clause imposes an outer
limit on extraterritorial prosecutions. 94 As one New York court described the
doctrine, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from “overreaching”
when they “exercise [criminal] jurisdiction over out-of-state events.” 95 Part II
explains why this doctrine is not especially restrictive in practice, 96 but here
the invocation of the Constitution is what matters. In due process cases, as in
venue and vicinage cases, courts believe it to be a constitutional problem when
state criminal law exceeds state borders.
Together, these examples portray a constitutional order wedded to territorialism. Indeed, they suggest that territorial criminal law was a critical part
of the project of constituting the United States. The rules on extradition and
criminal procedure in American constitutions are not just rules of the road
for efficient trials. These rules are how states announced their borders and
enacted their power to govern within them. (You can really tell you have a
state once its police arrest and imprison you.) Early Americans used criminal
law to instantiate state power and to navigate interstate relations, including
disputes over slavery. From this perspective, the territoriality principle is
bound up with the history of American federalism and reflects foundational
ideas about what it means to be a union of sovereign states.

90. Id. (describing Extradition Clause controversies beginning the year after the Constitution’s adoption, “all [of which] had to do with slavery”).
91. See supra notes 60–61.
92. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
93. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
94. See, e.g., State v. Rimmer, 877 N.W.2d 652, 665–66 (Iowa 2016) (“We agree with the
New Jersey Supreme Court that ‘[t]he extraterritorial application of state criminal law is subject
to due process analysis’ under the Fourteenth Amendment.” (alteration in original) (quoting
State v. Sumulikoski, 110 A.3d 856, 866 (N.J. 2015))); State v. Randle, 647 N.W.2d 324, 329 n.4
(Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (“Territorial jurisdiction is part of the due process restrictions on the power
of a court . . . .”); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962)
(noting that “due process” limits the permissible bases for criminal jurisdiction).
95. People v. Puig, 378 N.Y.S.2d 925, 934 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
96. See infra Part II.
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On a more prosaic level, the territoriality principle clearly has roots in
constitutional law. The previous Section explored how territoriality is ingrained in substantive criminal law, in concepts like the actus reus requirement and the prohibition on interstate enforcement of “penal” laws. The
observations in that Section apply broadly to criminal law in common law regimes. 97 Here, we might add that territorialism is also distinctively American.
The country’s federal and state constitutions contain clauses mandating territorial criminal procedures, limiting extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, and
requiring states to facilitate territorial criminal law enforcement. These provisions are one key reason we tend to think criminal law must be tied to a particular place.
C. Institutional Design
Territorialism is also built into the institutional design of the criminal legal system. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require crimes to be
prosecuted “in a district where the offense was committed” unless narrow exceptions apply. 98 State criminal procedure rules mirror this requirement, usually mandating prosecution in the county or district where a crime occurs. 99
This summary glosses over some important variation—for instance, states use
different words to limit venue, which, as the “vicinage” debate suggests, 100 reflects competing views about the values protected by criminal procedure.
Technically, state venue rules fall along a spectrum from more to less strictly
territorial. But they all embrace a baseline territorialism in which criminal
procedure hinges on the site of a crime.
Criminal law enforcement is organized around territory as well. Typically,
police are clumped into territorial units, such as the New York or Los Angeles
Police Departments. (The Bergen County Sheriff’s Office, the New Jersey State
97. See DUFF, supra note 12, at 103–04 (describing the “Territorial Principle” in English
criminal law); HIRST, supra note 38, at 1 (exploring the “territorial and extraterritorial ambit of
English criminal law”); Dubber, supra note 28, at 248 (comparing German “jurisdictional concepts” to “jurisdictional norms in common law countries”). As Dubber notes, “domestic criminal jurisdiction remains understudied.” Id. at 247. To the extent that modern scholars have
explored the topic, their discussion tends to focus on territoriality in common law regimes rather
than on American territorialism in particular. This approach highlights the pervasiveness of the
territoriality principle in criminal law, but it can obscure the ways in which territorialism is built
into American constitutions and tied up with ideas about American federalism.
98. FED. R. CRIM. P. 18. For a history of this rule, detailing its origins in Section 53 of the
Judicial Code of 1911, see Kershen II, supra note 57, at 15–20. See also infra Part II (exploring
how revisions to criminal procedure rules in the latter half of the twentieth century liberalized
and deterritorialized the venue requirement).
99. With exceptions for quirky scenarios like crimes committed on a county line. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE §§ 15-2-2, 15-2-7 (LexisNexis 2018); ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 18(b); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-109 (2020); CAL. PENAL CODE § 777 (West 2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-202
(2021); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 910.03(1) (West 2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-2-2 (2020); IDAHO CODE
§ 19-2120 (2017). This list could go on and would include nearly every state, with variations in
the precise language used to limit venue to some territorially defined area.
100. See supra Section I.B.
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Police, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation also work as examples here.
All of these law enforcement agencies are defined by geography and empowered to act within some legally bounded area.) The same is true of state prisons
and county jails, which have names like Ohio State Penitentiary and Cook
County Jail and receive funding through county and state corrections budgets. 101 Each of these law enforcement units purports to act on behalf of a certain place.
The United States also has a complex interstate extradition apparatus,
which developed from the Extradition Clause. 102 Before a person can be sent
to face criminal charges in another state, he must go through an elaborate legal
process that involves written notices, communication between state governors, approval from secretaries of state, and hearings before an Article III
court. 103 In Pennsylvania, for example, interstate extradition requires two warrants, three hearings, and twenty-two distinct steps. 104 Defendants have a federal constitutional right to this process, which they can sue to enforce. 105
All of which is to say there is a considerable edifice built up around the
idea that criminal law is territorial. American governments have organized
their law enforcement bureaucracies, allocated resources, and recognized enforceable rights to effectuate the presumption that criminal law has territorial
boundaries. Put simply, territorialism is shot through the entire system. In addition to being a foundational premise of substantive and constitutional law,
the territoriality principle is a basic feature of how criminal law is operationalized in the United States.
And then there is the practice of punishing noncitizens, which is perhaps
the clearest example of territorialism in American criminal law. The United
States has always subjected noncitizens within its borders to its criminal laws.
Foreign nationals have been prosecuted in state and federal criminal courts—
and imprisoned in state and federal prisons—for as long as those institutions
have existed. 106 The assumption behind this practice is that criminal law attaches as soon as a person enters the country whether or not she is a legal
member of the polity. This assumption is usually implicit, though when courts
need a citation they turn to the discussion of states’ police power in Mayor of

101. See, e.g., MAGGIE WEST, OHIO DEP’T OF REHAB. & CORR., GREENBOOK: LBO ANALYSIS
ENACTED BUDGET 1 (2019), https://www.lsc.ohio.gov/documents/budget/133/MainOperating/greenbook/DRC.PDF [perma.cc/D9WX-HMVB] (outlining the Ohio state prison budget).
102. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
103. For example, a chart on Pennsylvania’s government website depicts the state’s twentytwo-step extradition process. Extradition and Interstate Rendition, PA. OFF. OF GEN. COUNS.,
https://www.ogc.pa.gov/Extradition/Pages/default.aspx [perma.cc/5PA5-S35G].
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Crumley v. Snead, 620 F.2d 481, 483 (5th Cir. 1980) (“Almost 100 years
ago . . . the Supreme Court recognized that individuals have a federal right to challenge their
extradition by writ of habeas corpus. . . . Any denial of this right gives rise to a cause of action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . .”).
106. See Emma Kaufman, Segregation by Citizenship, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1388–94
(2019).
OF
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New York v. Miln, in which the Supreme Court observed that “[t]he right to
punish, or to prevent crime, does in no degree depend upon the citizenship of
the party who is obnoxious to the law.”107 Rather, the Miln Court explained, a
state has criminal jurisdiction “over all persons . . . within its territorial limits.” 108 Thus, the “alien who shall just have set his foot upon the soil of the
state, is just as subject to the operation of the law, as one who is a native citizen.” 109
The idea that a person who is not a citizen can nonetheless be subjected
to criminal law because the right to punish arises from “soil” is the essence of
the territoriality principle. In a regime based on this principle, criminal law is
egalitarian (because it is blind to personal traits like citizenship status) and
state-building (because it depends on and reaffirms state borders). Later Parts
of this Article discuss these features of territorial criminal law and consider
whether they are desirable. The goal here is simply to observe that territorialism is embedded in the institutional design of American criminal justice.
Though it often goes unremarked, the territoriality principle shapes everything from the organization and funding of police departments to the criminal
prosecution of hundreds of thousands of noncitizens each year. 110
D. Rhetoric
Territoriality is also a prominent theme in constitutional case law. Constitutional opinions are full of rhetoric about the inherently local nature of
criminal law. In the Rehnquist era, the Supreme Court invoked the localness
of criminal law to restrict congressional power under the Commerce

107. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 140 (1837), overruled in part by Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160 (1941); see also, e.g., In re Manuel P., 263 Cal. Rptr. 447, 458–59 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing Miln
in a juvenile delinquency case involving an undocumented minor from Tijuana).
108. Miln, 36 U.S. at 139.
109. Id. at 140.
110. The number of noncitizens subject to criminal prosecution across all fifty states in a
given year is difficult to determine because of imprecise data collection and inconsistent definitions of the term noncitizen. But to offer a rough sense of scale, California prosecutors filed
between 4.5 and 8.2 million criminal cases each year from 2010 to 2020, and in 2019, somewhere
between 14 and 19 percent of the state’s population was foreign born. See JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL.,
2020 COURT STATISTICS REPORT 83 (2020), https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2020-CourtStatistics-Report.pdf [perma.cc/T9WM-G5D7] (counting caseloads); Kristin F. Butcher & Anne
Morrison Piehl, Crime, Corrections, and California, CAL. COUNTS, Feb. 2008, at 1–2 (counting
noncitizen prisoners); Joseph Hayes, Justin Goss, Heather Harris & Alexandria Gumbs, California’s Prison Population, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL. (July 2019), https://www.ppic.org/publication/
californias-prison-population [perma.cc/Y4SY-MJ8L] (same). In the federal system, prosecutors
filed 57,822 criminal cases in 2020, and noncitizens made up approximately 16 percent of the
federal prison population. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL
STATISTICAL REPORT 4 (2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao/page/file/1390446/download [perma.
cc/7QLQ-YAW3] (counting caseloads); E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., PRISONERS IN 2020—STATISTICAL TABLES (2021), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/
p20st.pdf [perma.cc/47HA-36J6]. These figures suggest that huge numbers of noncitizens are
subjected to state and federal criminal laws each year.
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Clause. 111 In abstention and habeas cases, the Court has cited the local nature
of criminal law to explain why federal courts ought not police state criminal
proceedings. 112 Claims about criminal law’s localness also surface in Eighth 113
and Fourteenth 114 Amendment cases, in which the Supreme Court has upheld
harsh sentences and prosecution-friendly procedural rules on the ground that
criminal law is local and “belongs exclusively” 115 to states.
There is enormous nuance in these lines of doctrine. Each forms its own
field of study. But grouping them together demonstrates just how much work
rhetoric about the localness of criminal law is doing in constitutional jurisprudence. The idea that criminal law is local—naturally, fundamentally, traditionally, essentially—runs throughout constitutional thought. This idea has
been cited to support a state-centric conception of American federalism, a restrictive view of criminal defendants’ rights, and limits on the Article III
docket (which in turn maintain the prestige of federal courts). 116 The localness
111. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000) (“The Constitution requires a
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local. . . . [W]e can think of no better
example of the police power . . . than the suppression of violent crime . . . .”); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995); see also United States v. Lamont, 330 F.3d 1249, 1252 (9th
Cir. 2003) (referring to crime as “truly local” and noting that the “Supreme Court has recently
spoken with unusual force regarding the need to reserve to the states the exercise of the police
power in traditional criminal cases”); cf. Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 858 (2014) (“Perhaps the clearest example of traditional state authority is the punishment of local criminal activity.”).
112. On abstention, see, for example, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971) (announcing the doctrine), and In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074, 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000) (in a bankruptcy proceeding, citing Younger for the “fundamental policy against federal interference with
state criminal prosecutions” and stating that “[t]he right to formulate and enforce penal sanctions is an important aspect of [state] sovereignty” (first alteration in original) (first quoting
Younger, 401 U.S. at 46; then quoting Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 47 (1986))). On habeas,
see, for example, McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) (asserting that “[re]examination of
state convictions on federal habeas ‘frustrate[s] . . . the States’ sovereign power to punish offenders’ ” (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 487 (1986))), and Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,
128 (1982) (identifying the Great Writ’s costs “on our federal system,” including incursion on
states’ “primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law”).
113. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999–1000 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[M]arked divergences both in underlying theories of sentencing and in the length of prescribed prison terms are . . . inevitable [and] often beneficial . . . . [D]iffering attitudes and
perceptions of local conditions may yield different, yet rational, conclusions regarding the appropriate length of prison terms for particular crimes.”); Cocio v. Bramlett, 872 F.2d 889, 889,
891 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding as consistent with the Eighth Amendment a life sentence without
parole for a drunk driving accident that resulted in one death, asserting “the right of a state under
its police power to determine the proper prison sentence that should be imposed within its borders”).
114. See, e.g., Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445–46, 452 (1992) (rejecting a due process challenge to a California law that placed the burden to prove incompetence on the defendant
on the ground that “the criminal process is grounded in centuries of common-law tradition”).
115. Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 376 (1958).
116. See supra notes 111–114. On the relationship between Article III jurisdiction and federal court prestige, see Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the
Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 930 (2000).
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of criminal law is, in other words, part of the foundation on which American
constitutionalism is built.
Courts are not especially clear about what it means for criminal law to be
inherently local. Usually, the claim simply seems to mean that the federal government should let states manage an issue. But as the previous Section explained, the assertion that criminal law is local has a rich history: it refers to
an eighteenth-century conception of criminal jurisdiction in which the power
to define crimes and enforce criminal laws was limited to a particular territory. 117 At the founding, “crimes [were] considered ‘local’ in nature, i.e., local
to the territory of the enacting sovereign and local to the territory of the enforcing court.”118 Modern references to the “essential” and “traditional” localness of criminal law call forth this early American understanding of criminal
jurisdiction, which was premised on the territoriality principle. Thus, when
courts say criminal law is local, they are in an important sense saying that
criminal law is territorial.
This is yet another way in which territorialism lurks beneath American
law. The constitutional cases described above rarely include discussions of the
proper scope of criminal jurisdiction. These are cases about the Commerce
Clause, due process, and debt collection. 119 But they rely on rhetoric about the
territoriality of criminal law and indeed gain some of their force from the
looseness of that rhetoric. As we will see in Part II, the claim that criminal law
is quintessentially local becomes less persuasive the more one examines it. But
as a truism, this claim functions powerfully to support a slew of different constitutional doctrines. The territoriality principle is prevalent and potent in the
background of constitutional law as an unquestioned “maxim of American
jurisprudence.” 120 Its presence in so many corners of constitutional doctrine
helps to explain why it seems so strange to think that New York could criminalize gambling in Nevada or authorize Missouri to prosecute violations of
the New York criminal code.
II.

THE EROSION OF THE TERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE

After reading Part I, the territoriality principle should seem central to domestic criminal law, perhaps even required by the Constitution. Many aspects
of the American legal system, from the basic definition of crime to the organization of criminal justice institutions, work together to make criminal law feel
naturally and necessarily territorial. Yet, over the past century, criminal law’s
commitment to the territoriality principle has faltered.
This Part traces the trend away from territoriality in domestic criminal
law. It depicts a very different criminal justice system than we saw in Part I.
117. Kershen I, supra note 57, at 811 (citing JUSTIN MILLER, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW
§§ 178–182 (1934)).
118. Id.
119. See supra notes 111–114.
120. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 explanatory note (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft
1962).
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The legal regime outlined above was defined by geographic borders and was
particularly committed to state lines. The one below is flexible, negotiable, and
remarkably unconcerned about territorial limits on the police power.
To trace this system’s emergence, this Part proceeds chronologically
through the criminal legal process, from criminalization to policing, prosecution, and then punishment. In some ways, this approach is atypical. To the
extent that legal academics discuss criminal jurisdiction, they tend to focus
exclusively on criminalization and specifically on whether legislatures can
criminalize extraterritorial acts. 121 This Part departs from that norm by examining both criminalization and criminal law enforcement. It thus explores jurisdiction not just in the narrow terms of legislative intent but—to borrow the
Supreme Court’s phrase—in “its popular sense of authority to apply the law
to the acts of men.” 122
I take this approach because “the criminal law” is more than the set of
liability rules created by legislatures. One of the core insights of criminal law
scholarship of the past thirty years is that, given the extraordinary scope of the
criminal code, the real substance of criminal law is made by law enforcers—
by the police and prosecutors who decide which offenses are actually criminal. 123 From this perspective, it misses the point to study only criminalization.
To know if criminal law is territorial, one has to ask not only what conduct
legislatures decide to criminalize but also which crimes courts claim the power
to adjudicate, when police can cross borders, where criminal prosecutions
happen, and when punishment is tied to the place a crime occurred. The answer, it turns out, is that territorialism has eroded at every turn.
A. Criminalization
Criminal law begins when an authoritative legal body, typically a legislature, 124 decides that some conduct is criminal. At this stage of the criminal
legal process, the key question is how far a criminal law reaches. Theorists call
this the question of criminal law’s “geographical ambit.” 125 (So to review:
venue is where a criminal trial happens, vicinage is where the jury comes from,
and ambit is where the substantive criminal law applies.) As Part I noted, the
traditional view is that criminal statutes reach offenses within some defined

121. See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 12; THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (R.A. Duff et
al. eds., 2010); THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (R.A. Duff et al. eds., 2013); VINCENT
CHIAO, CRIMINAL LAW IN THE AGE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2019); Dubber, supra note
28; Ferzan, supra note 14; Zedner, supra note 12.
122. Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315, 320 (1909).
123. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
506 (2001) (“[P]rosecutors . . . are the criminal justice system’s real lawmakers.”).
124. See KADISH ET AL., supra note 29, at 162 (stating that “nearly all American jurisdictions . . . have now abolished [by statute] the common-law doctrine that courts can create new
crimes,” though “[t]he doctrine still survives in a few states” and the Supreme Court “has never
held it unconstitutional for state judges to create new common-law crimes”).
125. Farmer, supra note 14, at 231; see also HIRST, supra note 38, at 11.
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territory, like New Jersey or Pennsylvania. 126 But legislatures and courts have
expanded criminal law beyond these boundaries in several ways.
First, they have redefined crimes to stretch across multiple places. Take
the continuing offense doctrine, under which crimes such as fraud and possession of contraband continue to occur over time “and, possibly, in a number
of different places” 127 as a person moves around. Or consider inchoate offenses like attempt and conspiracy, whose definitions and relationship to the
actus reus requirement are notoriously fluid. 128 Because continuing offenses
travel with a person and the precise location of an inchoate offense is difficult
to pin down, these crimes have an attenuated relationship to geography. (This
problem is exacerbated when coconspirators can be charged for each other’s
actions and tried wherever an accomplice acted.) 129 Ongoing and inchoate
crimes make up a significant portion of the modern criminal docket. 130 Often,
they can be prosecuted in several different places.
Continuing and inchoate crimes are territorial insofar as a court must determine where they occurred before a criminal prosecution can proceed. Asking where a conspiracy or an ongoing theft took place is a territorial question.
But in modern criminal law, the answer to that question is often a legal fiction
based on artificial extensions of time and concepts like constructive presence. 131 The approach to territoriality when conceptualizing these crimes is a

126. See supra notes 39–42 (discussing the MPC provision on “territorial applicability” and
the presumption against extraterritorial application of state criminal law).
127. State v. Allah, 750 S.E.2d 903, 909 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
128. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 191–93 (1998) (discussing the origins and modern doctrine of conspiracy); KADISH ET AL., supra note 29, at 651–
56 (exploring the relationship between the actus reus requirement and attempt liability).
129. KADISH ET AL., supra note 29, at 745, 774 (describing “continuing controversy over
Pinkerton”); see also United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 8 (1998) (analyzing Hyde v. United
States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912), in which “[a]lthough none of the defendants had entered the District
[of Columbia] as part of the conspiracy, venue was nevertheless appropriate . . . based on the
overt acts of a co-conspirator there”). Note that the discussion of ambit is bleeding into venue
here. See infra Section II.C (addressing venue). See generally Farmer, supra note 14, at 231–32
(arguing that the distinction between ambit and venue is “artificial and technical” but nonetheless useful when exploring the geographic scope of criminal law).
130. State-level data collection and reporting varies, but for a rough sense of prevalence: in
2020, a continuing or inchoate offense was the top charge in 15 percent of New York criminal
arraignments, and 26.5 percent of New York state prisoners had a continuing or inchoate offense
as their top criminal charge. Div. of Tech. & Ct. Rsch., OCA-STAT Act Report, NYCOURTS, https://
ww2.nycourts.gov/oca-stat-act-31371 (June 15, 2021) (providing arraignment data); Inmates Under Custody: Beginning 2008, N.Y. STATE: OPENNY, https://data.ny.gov/w/55zc-sp6m/caer-yrtv?
cur=65n9o7AxVKY&from=rsP3XmFxvCz (June 15, 2021) (providing data on New York’s
prison population). Because these data list only the top charge in an arraignment or conviction,
they likely undercount continuing and inchoate offenses.
131. See Larry Kramer, Comment, Jurisdiction over Interstate Felony Murder, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1431, 1435 (1983).
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far cry from the eighteenth-century understanding of criminal jurisdiction described in Part I. 132 Ongoing and inchoate offenses are at best quasi-territorial—which is why, when legislatures invented continuing offenses in the early
1900s, defense attorneys argued that they violated the Venue Clause and the
Sixth Amendment. 133 That argument resurfaced in the 1970s, when critics
protested that the very “idea of a continuing offense must be declared unconstitutional.” 134 This objection has never been successful, but its persistence illustrates just how much ongoing crimes undermine the territoriality principle.
Courts have also relaxed territorial rules by expanding their own jurisdiction over out-of-state conduct. Think here about a Texas criminal case in
which prosecutors charged someone who forged a deed for Texas property
while in Louisiana 135 or a California court adjudicating the criminal prosecution of a Colorado-based doctor who prescribed pills that someone later ingested in California. 136 In these sorts of cases, criminal prosecutions are based
on the in-state effects of out-of-state activity. American courts first began to
recognize this species of criminal jurisdiction in the 1860s, 137 and the Supreme
Court upheld effects-based jurisdiction in 1911. 138 In embracing the effects
doctrine, Justice Holmes explained that a “civilized world” required a flexible
approach to the territoriality principle, so that even a criminal who had “never
had set foot in the State” could be punished if his conduct caused in-state
harm. 139 To put this precedent into some historical context: at the turn of the
twentieth century, as the federal government began to take shape and new
forms of transportation enabled mass mobility, 140 courts grew bolder about
their power over offenses committed outside the state.
The Constitution was no barrier to this development. As Part I explained,
the Due Process Clause is supposed to prevent states from “overreaching”

132. See supra Section I.B.
133. Kershen II, supra note 57, at 39–40 (citing cases challenging the Elkins Act of 1903,
in which “Congress introduced the concept of a continuing offense”).
134. Id. at 159.
135. Hanks v. State, 13 Tex. Ct. App. 289, 290–91 (1882).
136. Hageseth v. Superior Ct., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 385, 400–01 (Ct. App. 2007).
137. See Simpson v. State, 17 S.E. 984, 985–86 (Ga. 1893) (finding Georgia jurisdiction over
a defendant who fired a fatal shot from across the border in South Carolina); Commonwealth v.
Macloon, 101 Mass. 1, 6 (1869) (observing “[t]he general principle, that a man who does a criminal act in one county or state may be held liable for its continuous operation in another”); Commonwealth v. Smith, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 243, 259 (1865) (establishing Massachusetts criminal
jurisdiction over perjury committed out of state). The Supreme Court then cited these state cases
in Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911).
138. Strassheim, 221 U.S. at 285.
139. Id. at 284–85 (“If a jury should believe the evidence . . . the usage of the civilized world
would warrant Michigan in punishing him, although he had never set foot in the State until after
the fraud was complete.”).
140. See generally SARAH A. SEO, POLICING THE OPEN ROAD (2019).
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when they exercise criminal jurisdiction over extraterritorial activity. 141 But
one can search in vain for a meaningful due process limit on criminal prosecution of out-of-state conduct. Even the New York court that boldly denounced jurisdictional “overreaching” was eventually overturned. 142 In
practice, any effect inside a state—harm to a state resident, a piece of state
property, and so on—can ground a state criminal prosecution. 143 Again, this
approach to criminal law is basically territorial in that courts must conjure up
some connection to state soil to proceed. But the invention and expansion of
effects-based jurisdiction loosened nineteenth-century assumptions about the
limits of judicial power over criminal cases.
Courts have also developed nonterritorial theories of criminal jurisdiction. The most significant case in this category is Skiriotes v. Florida, a 1941
Supreme Court precedent. 144 Skiriotes arose when a Florida resident named
Lambiris Skiriotes went sponge fishing in the Gulf of Mexico. 145 The Sheriff of
Pinellas County arrested Skiriotes under a state law that banned sponge fishing in Florida; he was then prosecuted and convicted under state law. 146 The
Supreme Court upheld the conviction on the ground that Florida could “govern the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas with respect to matters in
which the State has a legitimate interest”—specifically, Florida’s “interest in
the proper maintenance of [a] sponge fishery.” 147 The Court thus concluded
that Florida could predicate its criminal laws on state citizenship rather than
state territory.
Skiriotes represents a remarkable shift away from the territoriality principle. The Supreme Court has never clarified the case’s outer boundaries, and
because the defendant was in international waters, it is not clear what would
happen if Florida criminalized its residents’ behavior in Georgia or Alabama. 148 While scholars have opined that such a statute could implicate “multiple complicated doctrines”—including due process, the Sixth Amendment,
141. See supra Section I.B (citing People v. Puig, 378 N.Y.S.2d 925, 935 (Sup. Ct. 1976), in
which a New York court observed that criminal jurisdiction under the relevant statute was limited to “out-of-state offenses which by their nature produce palpably harmful consequences
which are of necessity local and peculiarly injurious to the rights of [the] state or its citizens,”
not out-of-state “offenses pertaining to the general community welfare”).
142. People v. Kassebaum, 696 N.Y.S.2d 23, 24 (App. Div. 1999) (rejecting the jurisdictional limitation in Puig), aff’d, 744 N.E.2d 694 (N.Y. 2001).
143. For one case grounding criminal jurisdiction on the in-state effects of extraterritorial
activity, see infra notes 144–147 and accompanying text. For more, see, for example, In re
Vasquez, 705 N.E.2d 606, 610–12 (Mass. 1999); State v. Kane, 625 A.2d 1361, 1363 (R.I. 1993);
Roberts v. State, 619 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); and State v. Doyen, 676 A.2d 345,
349 (Vt. 1996).
144. 313 U.S. 69, 79 (1941).
145. Brief of Appellant at 7, Skiriotes, 313 U.S. 69 (No. 658).
146. Id. at 7, 10.
147. Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 75–77.
148. Conflicts scholars considered these questions in the 1990s after the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992). The prospect that abortion “would be remitted entirely to the political process”
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the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the right to travel 149—Skiriotes established that criminal law can attach by virtue of citizenship rather than soil. If
there is a limit on the ambit of criminal law, it will have to come from as-yetunannounced constitutional rules, not a requirement that criminal law must
be territorial.
Skiriotes is the most prominent example of deterritorialized domestic
criminal law. But the basic proposition in the case is that state criminal law
can proceed without a clear territorial hook. This precept guides more run-ofthe-mill cases too. Sometimes, for example, courts ground criminal jurisdiction on a state’s general interests in some industry or value rather than on the
effects of a crime. In 2017, Florida invoked its interest in the cruise ship industry to try an attempted sexual assault between two noncitizens at sea. 150
Alaska has succeeded with similar prosecutions undertaken in the name of the
state’s “tourism industry.”151 These sorts of cases extend the theory of effectsbased criminal jurisdiction to include abstract harms to a state’s economic and
political order. At that point, territoriality has more or less disappeared.
Courts have also extended the scope of state criminal law by relaxing the
rules around extradition. Part I outlined the development of an elaborate legal
apparatus to facilitate interstate extradition. 152 Initially, state governments
used that apparatus to regulate and denounce each other’s criminal legal systems. In 1860, Ohio’s governor refused to extradite a man who helped to free
a slave in Kentucky. 153 In the 1930s, New Jersey’s governor declined to extradite Robert Elliott Burns after reading his memoir, I Am a Fugitive from a
Georgia Chain Gang!. 154 In 1975, the governor of Tennessee ignored Oklahoma’s request to extradite country singer Faron Young, who was “wanted on

prompted academics to examine whether states could prohibit their residents from traveling to
other states to obtain abortions. Seth F. Kreimer, “But Whoever Treasures Freedom . . .”: The
Right to Travel and Extraterritorial Abortions, 91 MICH. L. REV. 907, 907 (1993); see also Lea
Brilmayer, Interstate Preemption: The Right to Travel, the Right to Life, and the Right to Die, 91
MICH. L. REV. 873, 880 (1993). More recently, scholars have explored a similar question with
respect to marijuana laws. See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, Marijuana, State Extraterritoriality, and
Congress, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1013, 1015 (2017).
149. Rosen, supra note 148, at 1015 (listing doctrines implicated by extraterritorial state
regulation, though not focusing on criminal statutes); cf. Sachs, supra note 31, at 1734 (discussing civil personal jurisdiction).
150. Paul v. State, 233 So. 3d 1181, 1183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
151. State v. Jack, 125 P.3d 311, 322 (Alaska 2005) (justifying the criminal prosecution of
a sexual assault on an offshore ferry on the ground that “ferries are important to the tourism
industry . . . and [Alaska’s] economy.”).
152. See supra Section I.C.
153. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (23 How.) 66, 66–67 (1861), overruled by Puerto Rico
v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 224 (1987) (overruling Dennison’s holding that the federal court could
not compel compliance with the Extradition Clause).
154. Kenyon Bunch & Richard J. Hardy, Continuity or Change in Interstate Extradition?
Assessing Puerto Rico v. Branstad, PUBLIUS, Winter 1991, at 51, 55.
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a morals charge.” 155 Until the 1970s, state courts policed extradition too, denying requests when they felt a sister state had failed to show probable cause.156
The Supreme Court put a stop to that practice in 1978 when it held that state
courts may not opine on the sufficiency of extradition requests. 157 Instead, the
Court emphasized, judicial approval of extradition is “summary and mandatory.” 158
This development in extradition doctrine undermined the territoriality
principle. As Part I pointed out, extradition is quintessentially territorial; it is
the practice of sending fugitives back to the “right” state to be tried. Extradition is criminal law’s substitute for choice of law and in that respect is the
lynchpin of territorialism. But making extradition mandatory weakens the territoriality principle, because it means that the borders of state criminal law
matter less. Imagine two countries: one that refuses to extradite a criminal and
one where extradition is routine. Territorial borders are more meaningful in
the first country—the one where you are safe once you touch its soil. The
scope of criminal law feels more territorial there too, since the offended country’s laws cannot reach you.
In other words, denying extradition is one way to make clear that criminal
law has geographic limits. By requiring “summary and mandatory” extradition between states, the Supreme Court has ensured that Arizona’s criminal
laws reach New Hampshire, and vice versa. The Court made this choice explicitly. In Michigan v. Doran, a leading extradition case, Chief Justice Burger
explained that mandatory extradition “foster[s] national unity” by preventing
any state from becoming “a sanctuary for fugitives” and “ ‘balkaniz[ing]’ the
administration of criminal justice.” 159 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Burger articulated a national vision of criminal law: “In the administration of
justice, no less than in trade and commerce,” unity is “served by de-emphasizing state lines.” 160 Modern extradition doctrine thus extends the reach of
state criminal laws to the edges of the nation. As a practical matter, summary

155. Id. at 55 & n. 22 (citing this and other “historical examples of governors refusing to
grant extradition”); see also Extradition Refused, LONGVIEW NEWS-J., Dec. 4, 1975, at 7–8.
156. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289–90 (1978) (overruling the Michigan Supreme
Court’s holding that Arizona’s probable cause determination was deficient); see also Wellington
v. South Dakota, 413 F. Supp. 151, 154 (D.S.D. 1976) (denying extradition on the ground that
Minnesota had failed to establish probable cause “to the satisfaction of the State court”); Ierardi
v. Gunter, 528 F.2d 929, 932 (1st Cir. 1976) (drawing the same conclusion in a case involving
extradition to Florida from Massachusetts).
157. Doran, 439 U.S. at 289.
158. Id. at 288–89. The Supreme Court’s mandatory approach to extradition is particularly
important because the Court has “interpreted the crimes for which a person is subject to extradition very broadly, to include every offense punishable by the law of the [requesting] state.”
Gross & Upham, supra note 89.
159. Doran, 439 U.S. at 287–88.
160. Id. at 288.

382

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 121:353

extradition means that it is not particularly difficult to prosecute someone
who flees across a state border. 161
There are important technical distinctions between the examples in this
Section. Conceptually, there is a difference between a legislature’s power to
deem conduct criminal (legislative jurisdiction) and a court’s power to adjudicate criminal cases (judicial jurisdiction). The former power is what the
term “criminalization” calls to mind, while the exercise of judicial jurisdiction
is rarely described as an instance of criminalization. 162 Both types of jurisdiction are different from questions about the functional reach of Maine or Texas
criminal law given modern extradition rules.
In a course on criminal jurisdiction, one would parse these distinctions.
But here the salient observation is that a range of doctrinal shifts have come
together to extend the reach of domestic criminal law. When legislatures define crimes to cover extraterritorial conduct and courts exert jurisdiction over
out-of-state activities, both acts expand state criminal law beyond its traditional boundaries. The result is a corpus of criminal law that is detached from
territorial borders—not wholly, but more than one might expect.
B. Policing
The deterritorialization of American criminal law is even more pronounced in law enforcement. As Part I noted, police are typically organized
into territorial units. Police officers wear badges engraved with city insignia 163
and swear oaths to state constitutions. 164 Yet, in practice, cooperative agreements and permissive doctrines mean policing is only loosely tied to boundary
lines.
Sometimes the deterritorialization of policing is formal, as when police
departments sign agreements to provide “mutual aid.” 165 Many states permit
local law enforcement agencies to enter partnerships under which they can

161. This doctrine may become a flashpoint now that the Supreme Court overturned Roe
v. Wade. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022); see, e.g., David S. Cohen, Greer Donley & Rachel Rebouché, The New Abortion Battleground, 123 COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2023) (arguing that abortion-supportive states should exempt abortion providers
from state extradition law).
162. But see Adventure Commc’ns, Inc. v. Ky. Registry of Election Fin., 191 F.3d 429, 435–
36 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that although legislative and judicial jurisdiction are distinct, “the
concepts are closely related” in that both are governed “by the due process clause” and the standards for evaluating each kind of jurisdiction “substantial[ly] overlap”).
163. Ray Rivera, The Officer Is Real; The Badge May Be an Imposter, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30,
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/01/nyregion/01badge.html [perma.cc/8QQM-EZ8P].
164. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 62 (McKinney 2011); see also Personnel Service Bulletin from William J. Diamond (Mar. 21, 1997), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/dcas/downloads/
pdf/reports/100_6.pdf [perma.cc/4YRT-EXRV].
165. See, e.g., Mutual Police Assistance Compact Signed by Stonington, Conn. (July 14,
2017) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). I obtained this agreement and many other police
policy documents through a series of open records requests under state law.
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police each other’s territory. 166 These mutual aid agreements, which are essentially private contracts between police departments, create standing commitments to share resources and jointly enforce criminal laws.167 Police
departments also enter into memoranda of understanding (MOUs) and more
informal agreements to combine their powers. 168 These contracts expand the
footprint of local police departments—or, as one 1988 white paper put it, mutual aid agreements “knit jurisdictions together.” 169
The standard mutual aid agreement merges the staff and resources of two
small, neighboring police departments within a single state. 170 But mutual aid
compacts can extend “local” policing much further. In some states, municipal
police can contract to provide services outside the state. In Nebraska, for example, “[a]ny city or village” can authorize its police to assist another state’s
police force. 171 Local police departments can also join multijurisdictional task
forces that span state boundaries. 172 These task forces are designed to overcome territorial jurisdictional limits. They are a mechanism to blur legal

166. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 23.1225(1)(a) (West 2021); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40, § 4J
(LexisNexis 2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48:11-a (2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-10-4(a)
(LexisNexis 2019). See generally JOHN M. BAINES, ROBERT HEGGESTAD, DALE A. KELLEY &
CHARLES P. WHITE, MUTUAL AID PLANNING 8–9 (1973) (providing a national overview of mutual aid statutes).
167. See e.g., Ball v. City of Coral Gables, 301 F. App’x 865, 867 (11th Cir. 2008); Commonwealth v. Pike, 41 N.E.3d 332, 2015 WL 8285092, at *2 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015) (unpublished table
decision) (reading a mutual aid agreement to grant a police officer “the authority to effectuate
an extraterritorial stop”).
168. See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement Between the Town of Glastonbury and the
Town of East Hampton for Public Safety Dispatch Services (May 17, 2016) [hereinafter East
Hampton MOU] (on file with the Michigan Law Review). On the practice of “pooling” of statutory powers through interagency cooperation, see Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 211 (2015).
169. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELS., METROPOLITAN ORGANIZATION:
THE ST. LOUIS CASE, at iii (1988), https://library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/Reports/information/m-158.pdf
[perma.cc/G9RA-8X7A].
170. See, e.g., East Hampton MOU, supra note 168; Non-Emergency Interagency Agreement Between Darien, Greenwich, New Canaan & Stamford Police Departments (Nov. 30, 2012)
(on file with the Michigan Law Review).
171. NEB. REV. STAT. § 18-1706 (2021) (“Any city or village may by resolution authorize
its . . . police department or any portion thereof to provide . . . police[] and emergency service
outside of the limits of such city or village either within or without the state.”).
172. See, e.g., Four Arrests Linked to 24 Robberies of Elderly, ABC7 (Mar. 21, 2008) [hereinafter Four Arrests], https://abc7chicago.com/archive/6035045 [perma.cc/E39U-Y5Z5] (describing a
task force between Chicago and Indiana police); see also DAVID W. HAYESLIP & MALCOLM L.
RUSSELL-EINHORN, EVALUATION OF MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL TASK FORCES PROJECT 10 (2002),
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/200904.pdf [perma.cc/2HTM-N289] (describing a federal grant program created in 1988 to encourage multijurisdictional task forces “to target gangs,
illegal firearms, specific crimes and other cross-jurisdictional crime-related problems”).
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boundaries so that “city and suburban cops in Illinois and Indiana” can
“work[] the case together.” 173
At a high level of generality, cooperative policing is nothing new. American police departments have always shared equipment and “backup forces,”
particularly during emergencies. 174 But police sharing practices were interlocal and “strictly informal” until the 1930s, when increased mobility prompted
a movement to expand and institutionalize interjurisdictional policing. 175 In
1934, citing concerns about “the interstate nature of crime and the growing
complexity of law enforcement,” Congress passed the Crime Prevention Compact Act (CPCA). 176 That statute authorized states to enter compacts “for cooperative effort and mutual assistance in the prevention of crime and in the
enforcement of their respective criminal laws and policies.” 177 The CPCA encouraged states to establish “such agencies, joint or otherwise, as they may
deem desirable for making [cooperative policing] effective.” 178
A flurry of state laws followed. In the wake of the CPCA, states passed
statutes enabling cooperative policing and establishing interjurisdictional
criminal task forces. 179 States also began to enter regional compacts that provided for joint policing and created centralized “criminal intelligence bureau[s]” to gather and disseminate information about crime. 180 This
cooperative model flourished during World War II as local law enforcement
agencies coordinated their training programs and emergency plans for “civil
defense.” 181
Cooperative policing then expanded in the 1960s, when police turned to
mutual aid agreements to manage civil unrest, Vietnam protests, and “rock

173. Four Arrests, supra note 172 (explaining that a Chicago-area task force developed after
police “noticed that our . . . criminals utilized our borders to commit crimes . . . in Chicago and
flee to the neighboring suburbs and into Indiana”).
174. BAINES ET AL., supra note 166, at 1 (tracing “the origins and development of law enforcement mutual aid in the United States” (cleaned up)).
175. Id.
176. Id.; Crime Prevention Compact Act, ch. 406, 48 Stat. 909, 909 (1934) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 420).
177. Crime Prevention Compact Act, 48 Stat. at 909.
178. Id.
179. In order of passage, see, for example, Act of June 30, 1936, No. 94, § 20, 1936 La. Acts
280, 285 (codified as amended at LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1391 (2016)); Act of Apr. 17, 1946, ch. 834,
1946 N.Y. Laws 1601, 1603 (codified in relevant part at N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §§ 209-f to -g
(McKinney 2016)); Act of June 11, 1947, No. 198, 1947 Ohio Laws 288 (codified as amended at
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 737.04 (LexisNexis 2015)); and Interlocal Co-operation Act, ch. 100,
1957 Kan. Sess. Laws 255 (codified as amended at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-2904 (2021)).
180. See, e.g., Act Adopting the New England State Police Compact, No. 315, 1967 Conn.
Pub. Acts 377 (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-162 (2021)) (forming the “New
England State Police Compact”); Act of June 14, 1971, No. 159, § 3, 1971 La. Acts 467, 468 (repealed 2022) (forming the Southern State Police Compact).
181. BAINES ET AL., supra note 166, at 2 (“During World War II the Mutual Aid concept
expanded . . . . Contingency plans were developed and training commenced . . . to enable law enforcement agencies to better cope with possible enemy attack or invasion.”).
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festivals.” 182 Between 1960 and 1972, twenty-five states and the District of Columbia passed laws enabling interjurisdictional policing. 183 By the 1980s, federal commissions were studying how best to coordinate local police forces, 184
and the federal government was awarding grants to encourage multijurisdictional task forces. 185 Federal funds for these local partnerships ballooned after

182. Id.
183. In chronological order, see Act of Mar. 31, 1953, ch. 144, § 9, 1953 Alaska Sess. Laws
ch. 144, § 9 (codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. § 19.65.090 (2020)); Act of Apr. 3, 1962,
ch. 623, § 15.1-131, 1962 Va. Acts 960, 991 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1724
(Supp. 2021)); Act of Apr. 15, 1963, ch. 207, § 1, 1963 Colo. Sess. Laws 207, 207 (codified as
amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-5-103 (2021)); Act of Apr. 28, 1965, ch. 382, 1965 Mass. Acts
204 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 41, § 99 (2020)); Act of May 17, 1965, ch. 106,
1965 R.I. Acts & Resolves 381 (codified at 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-37-1 (2007)); Act of Sept. 3,
1965, ch. 435, 1965 Me. Laws 591 (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1665 (2007)); Act
of Jan. 1, 1966, ch. 722, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 362, 362–63 (codified as amended at TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03 (West Supp. 2022)); Act of June 21, 1967, ch. 846, 1967 N.C. Sess.
Laws 1090 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-288 (2021)); Act of July 10, 1967,
No. 236, 1967 Mich. Pub. Acts 350 (codified as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV.
§§ 123.811–.814 (LexisNexis 2021)); Act of Aug. 8, 1967, ch. 105, 1967 Wis. Sess. Laws 445 (codified as amended at WIS. STAT. § 66.0313 (2022)); Act Concerning Mutual Police Assistance
Among Municipalities, No. 198, 1967 Conn. Pub. Acts 255 (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7277a (2021)); Act Adopting the New England State Police Compact, No. 315, 1967 Conn. Pub.
Acts 377 (codified at CONN. GEN. STATE § 29-162 (2021)); Act of Mar. 15, 1968, No. 288, 1967
Vt. Acts & Resolves 153 (codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 1951–1959, 1971–1972 (2021));
Act of Mar. 21, 1968, ch. 68, 1968 Ky. Acts 193 (codified as amended at KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 65.255 (LexisNexis 2014)); Act of Apr. 13, 1968, No. 1054, 1968 S.C. Acts 2521 (codified as
amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-7-120 (2004)); Act of Aug. 5, 1968, No. 2157, 1968 Ill. Laws 26
(codified in relevant part at 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 1-4-8 (West 2020)); Act of Aug. 12,
1968, ch. 1222, 1968 Cal. Stat. 2302 (codified as amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.1 (West
2020)); Act of Oct. 17, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-587, 82 Stat. 1150 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE
§ 2-209.01 (2022)); Act of Apr. 17, 1969, ch. 177, 1969 Okla. Sess. Laws 227 (codified at OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 34-103(a) (West 2022)); Act of May 14, 1969, ch. 596, 1969 Md. Laws 1398
(codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 2-105 (LexisNexis 2018)); Act of June
11, 1969, ch. 224, 1969 N.H. Laws 170 (codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106-D:1 (2013));
Florida Mutual Aid Act, ch. 69-112, 1969 Fla. Laws 589 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 23.12–.127 (West 2014)); Police Mutual Aid Agreement Act, ch. 433, 57 Del. Laws 1222
(1970) (codified as amended at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1941–1947 (2015)); Act of Apr. 12,
1971, ch. 51, § 8, 1971 Ariz. Sess. Laws 119, 125–38 (codified as amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 26-309 (Supp. 2021)); Act of June 9, 1971, ch. 197, 1971 N.J. Laws 773, 787–89 (codified
in relevant part at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-156 (West 2019)); and Mutual Aid Act, ch. 153, § 3,
1971 N.M. Laws 440, 440 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-8-3 (2022)).
184. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELS., supra note 169, at 61–
63.
185. HAYESLIP & RUSSELL-EINHORN, supra note 172, at 10; see also High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Areas, OFF. OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y (2021), https://www.hidtaprogram.org/
summary.php [perma.cc/EL3F-FN9K] (describing a program created by Congress in 1988 to
“coordinate[] . . . Federal, State, Local, and Tribal law enforcement agencies . . . to address regional drug threats”).
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September 11, 2001, as police associations argued that only an “interjurisdictional enforcement approach” could “address the threats of international and
domestic terrorism.” 186
The rise of cooperative policing deserves its own separate study. The birth
and expansion of mutual aid agreements is a fascinating case of subfederal
coordination and bureaucratic state-building. This model of policing provides
a counternarrative to the dominant account of twentieth-century criminal
law, which emphasizes the proliferation of federal criminal laws and the emergence of a federal enforcement bureaucracy that (the story goes) displaced
state and local police. 187 Mutual aid agreements complicate this federalization
story. They show that criminal law expanded during the twentieth century not
just because the federal government grew but also because—in the shadow of
a growing federal government, and perhaps in resistance to it—states and localities formed regional unions that detached criminal law from territorial
borders and upended nineteenth-century ideas about criminal jurisdiction.
This history is nuanced, but even the quick version illustrates that modern
policing is significantly less tied to jurisdictional boundaries than the phrase
“local police” suggests. Over the course of the twentieth century, contracts to
provide emergency aid became broader agreements to combine both the resources and the legal authority of local police forces. Today, mutual aid agreements are routine.
Sometimes, moreover, agreements are not even necessary. Although
compacts and task forces are particularly clear examples of interjurisdictional
policing, local law enforcement is deterritorialized in other ways as well. Some
jurisdictions, for example, empower nominally local police to act anywhere in
the state. 188 In California, a peace officer’s authority extends to any offense he
witnesses; 189 in Connecticut, “active members of any . . . police force in a
town, city, or borough” can execute warrants statewide. 190 Texas permits out-

186. BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., MUTUAL AID:
MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PARTNERSHIPS FOR MEETING REGIONAL THREATS, at vii–1 (2005), https://
www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/bja/210679.pdf [perma.cc/YH6Z-JMQH].
187. See Daniel C. Richman & Sarah Seo, Driving Toward Autonomy? The FBI in the Federal System, 1908–1960, at 3 (Univ. of Iowa, Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper No. 2019-22, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3415103 [perma.cc/C6XS-6EP6] (identifying and critiquing this federalization narrative); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and
Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from the States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519, 523–29 (2011)
(summarizing “the existing debate over the federalization of crime”).
188. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.1 (West 2020) (outlining when the authority of municipal police officers “extends to any place in the state”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-281 (2021) (authorizing local police to execute warrants “in any part of the state”); see also Armendariz v. State,
123 S.W.3d 401, 404–05 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (construing Texas’s criminal code, which authorizes local “peace officers” to make arrests when they observe illegal conduct, to permit an
arrest outside “the Odessa police officers’ geographic jurisdiction”).
189. CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.1(a)(3) (West 2020).
190. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-281 (2021).
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of-state police officers to enter its territory to make arrests for felonies committed elsewhere. 191 Tennessee has a “special enforcement unit” focused on
Medicaid fraud, whose police routinely arrest people “in Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia.” 192 These practices abrade territorial jurisdictional boundaries.
Most states also have “citizen’s arrest” statutes that allow private citizens
to apprehend alleged criminals. 193 Courts have relied on these statutes, which
are controversial relics of the Reconstruction era, 194 to uphold arrests made by
police officers outside of their territorial jurisdiction. 195 Some states even relax
“the requirements for a citizen’s arrest” when the citizen in question is a police
officer—a doctrine that turns police into sort of roving super-citizens. 196
Courts use “hot pursuit” doctrines to a similar effect. 197 These doctrines create
exceptions to “the territorial limits of . . . [police] jurisdiction” and expand the
scope of criminal law enforcement. 198 They do so deliberately. In adopting a
wide interpretation of the state’s hot pursuit law in 1991, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court explained that “constructing impenetrable jurisdictional walls
benefit[s] only the criminals hidden in their shadows.” 199
One could go on and on with gripping stories of extraterritorial policing—of late-night arrests outside city limits 200 and NYPD raids in Newark. 201
191. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.051 (West 2015).
192. Amy Yurkanin, The TennCare Trap: How One State’s War on Medicaid Fraud Ensnares
Working Moms in Alabama, AL.COM (Apr. 28, 2021, 2:31 PM), https://www.al.com/news/2021/04/
the-tennessee-trap-how-one-states-war-on-medicaid-fraud-ensnares-working-moms-in-alabama.html [perma.cc/9DAJ-7S97].
193. See Citizen’s Arrest Laws by State, SOLS. INST., https://solutions-institute.org/tools/citizens-arrest-laws-by-state [perma.cc/NU3V-4MS6].
194. See Kemp Hails Passage of Legislation to Repeal Citizen’s Arrest Law in Georgia,
WRDW (Apr. 1, 2021, 11:45 AM), https://www.wrdw.com/2021/04/01/kemp-hails-passage-oflegislation-to-repeal-citizens-arrest-law-in-georgia [perma.cc/93PB-BU6E] (describing the history of Georgia’s citizen’s arrest statute, which was amended after the murder of Ahmaud Arbery).
195. See, e.g., State ex rel. State v. Gustke, 516 S.E.2d 283, 290–91 (W. Va. 1999) (upholding
such an arrest and citing cases from eighteen states in which courts had done the same); People
v. Lahr, 566 N.E.2d 12, 13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (“An extensive line of cases in Illinois has upheld
the validity of extraterritorial arrests made by police officers who, lacking official authority, were
found to have been authorized to make ‘citizen’s arrests.’ ”).
196. E.g., Commonwealth v. Claiborne, 667 N.E.2d 873, 876 (Mass. 1996).
197. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Peters, 965 A.2d 222, 225 (Pa. 2009) (“[W]e note that the
[hot pursuit statute] is to be construed liberally to give effect to its purposes.”).
198. Id. at 223 (citing 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8953(a)).
199. Commonwealth v. Merchant, 595 A.2d 1135, 1139 (Pa. 1991). This dictum has become something of a maxim in hot pursuit cases. See Peters, 965 A.2d at 225 (citing Merchant,
595 A.2d at 1139)); Commonwealth v. Henry, 943 A.2d 967 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (citing Merchant, 595 A.2d at 1139)).
200. Gustke, 516 S.E.2d at 286.
201. Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, NYPD Built Secret Files on NJ, Long Island Mosques,
NBC4 N.Y. (Feb. 22, 2012, 10:13 a.m.), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/muslim-surveillance-nypd-newark-cory-booker-mosque/1972322 [perma.cc/XK2S-39U4].
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Together, these examples demonstrate that the borders of police jurisdiction
are negotiable. Territorial jurisdiction is not meaningless; the technical limits
of police authority still matter to police, to defendants, and to some courts.
But mutual aid agreements, task forces, compacts, citizen’s arrest statutes, and
hot pursuit doctrines are all legal devices that detach policing from geography.
In practice, the insignia on police uniforms belie a nuanced, interjurisdictional
reality in which “local” and “state” police have more than local and state
power.
C. Prosecution
It is no surprise that police cross borders. Policing is, after all, an infamously discretionary activity. 202 But one would expect prosecution to be different. Given the Constitution’s focus on criminal trials—the Venue Clause,
the Vicinage Clause, all the debate over criminal trials at the founding 203—it
would seem as if prosecution must have strict geographic boundaries. 204 Even
at this phase of the criminal legal process, though, territorialism has receded.
Several historical developments drove the deterritorialization of prosecution. First, in the late nineteenth century, courts began to distinguish jurisdiction from venue. 205 As Part I explained, early American legislators and courts
adopted a common law theory of criminal jurisdiction in which the power to
hear a criminal case and the location of a criminal trial were coextensive because crime was “inherently local.” 206 That conception of criminal jurisdiction
started to splinter in the 1870s as Congress began to separate federal judicial
districts into smaller divisions. 207 The subdivision of judicial districts raised a
new question: Could federal trial courts adjudicate criminal cases involving
crimes in another division within the same district? The Supreme Court answered that question in the affirmative in a trio of cases between 1892 and
1897. 208 Those cases began to carve out a distinction between the power to
conduct criminal proceedings and the proper place for a criminal trial.

202. See John Paul Stevens, Our ‘Broken System’ of Criminal Justice, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov.
10, 2011), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2011/11/10/our-broken-system-criminal-justice
[perma.cc/6YTH-5X49] (reviewing STUNTZ, supra note 30) (discussing the expansion of police
discretion).
203. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (“The principle that there is a
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”); see
also supra Section I.B (describing state and federal constitutional limitations on the location of
criminal trials).
204. See supra Section I.B.
205. Kershen II, supra note 57, at 3–6 (providing a detailed account of this history).
206. See supra Section I.B.
207. Kershen II, supra note 57, at 4.
208. Id. at 5 (discussing Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892), Post v. United States,
161 U.S. 583 (1896), and Rosencrans v. United States, 165 U.S. 257 (1897)).
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That distinction deepened between 1925 and 1931, when appellate
courts—first the Fifth Circuit, 209 then the D.C. Circuit 210—held that venue was
a criminal procedure right that could be waived. Once venue was a right that
belonged to criminal defendants rather than a limit on judicial power or a requirement for the legitimacy of criminal trials, the separation of jurisdiction
and venue was “complete.” 211 Defendants could agree to move trials (or
simply fail to make a timely venue objection), 212 and so long as the court could
find a hook for its jurisdiction, the criminal prosecution could proceed.
Recall, moreover, that the Supreme Court expanded the bases for criminal
jurisdiction to include the effects of a crime in 1911. 213 As the previous Section
explained, courts began to adopt a bolder and more flexible approach to judicial power over out-of-state crime during the progressive era. Alongside that
doctrinal shift, venue’s transformation into a criminal procedure right meant
that criminal trials could be prosecuted in a wider range of places. By the middle of the twentieth century, venue was a right that defendants could forfeit or
waive. Jurisdiction was a separate matter, satisfied so long as a crime caused
harm or implicated an interest in the place where the court sat. 214
This new approach to criminal jurisdiction enabled a second development: the spread of special venue laws. Once courts had abandoned strict territorial ideas about their power in criminal cases, legislatures began to pass
more laws dislocating criminal prosecution. 215 These laws take several forms.
The most common is the “specific” venue statute, which designates the place
of trial for a certain type of offense. Specific venue statutes can provide for
venue in a particular court or in multiple places—for example, anywhere a
stolen item is taken, carried, or found. 216 Their close cousin, the “buffer” statute, allows prosecutors to choose between neighboring counties when crimes
occur in multiple jurisdictions or near a county boundary line. 217 State laws
and procedural rules can also allow prosecutions to proceed where a person is

209. Silverberg v. United States, 4 F.2d 908, 909 (5th Cir. 1925).
210. Hagner v. United States, 54 F.2d 446, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1931), aff’d, 285 U.S. 427 (1932).
211. Kershen II, supra note 57, at 9.
212. See, e.g., People v. Simon, 25 P.3d 598 (Cal. 2001) (holding that a criminal defendant
had forfeited his venue challenge).
213. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S.
280, 281, 285 (1911)).
214. See supra Section II.A (describing the emergence of effects-based criminal jurisdiction
in the early twentieth century).
215. There are a handful of specific venue statutes that predate the 1920s, but this legal
device really gained traction after the 1930s. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33223,
VENUE: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF WHERE A FEDERAL CRIME MAY BE TRIED 3–16 (2018).
216. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3238; see also infra note 218 (citing state law sources).
217. See Brian C. Kalt, Crossing Eight Mile: Juries of the Vicinage and County-Line Criminal
Buffer Statutes, 80 WASH. L. REV. 271, 274, 277 (2005) (surveying these statutes and arguing that
“buffer statutes should be eliminated”).
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arrested or resides. 218 These laws are exceptional; as Part I explained, venue is
usually proper in the county where the crime occurs. 219 But special venue statutes demonstrate that, in modern criminal law, legislatures can move trials
where they wish. (Courts participate here too, by treating venue defects as
harmless.) 220
Prosecution also grew more coordinated and centralized during the twentieth century. Like police, prosecutors can join task forces to investigate and
try offenses that span formal boundary lines. In New York City, for example,
a “Special Narcotics Prosecutor” appointed by the district attorneys from the
city’s five boroughs can prosecute drug and related crimes across the city. 221
The state created this interjurisdictional office in 1971 “to address [the] free
flow of narcotics across county lines.” 222 Illinois began to establish similar
“multijurisdictional drug prosecution units” in the early 1980s. 223 California
uses an analogous model for identity theft crimes, which can be combined
with “all associated offenses,” consolidated, and tried in the county of the
prosecutor’s choice. 224
It is important not to overstate the trend toward centralized prosecution.
Criminal prosecution of state law remains one of the most localized and varied
parts of the American justice system. 225 States routinely delegate prosecutorial
power to local actors, who often act without centralized oversight. 226 The impression here should not be one of a highly consolidated legal regime. But
there is no question that technological developments and relaxed conceptions
of criminal jurisdiction encouraged cooperation between prosecutors and

218. See, e.g., TENN. R. CRIM. P. 18(d)(2) (“An offense committed wholly outside Tennessee may be prosecuted in any Tennessee county in which the offender is found.”); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 13.01 (West 2015) (“Offenses committed wholly or in part outside this
State . . . may be prosecuted in any county where the offender is found . . . .”); UTAH CODE. ANN.
§ 76-1-202(g) (2017) (providing for trials in the county where a defendant resides, is apprehended, or to which he is extradited in cases where the site of the crime is unclear); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-109(C) (2020) (same); OR. REV. STAT. § 131.325 (2021) (same); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-244(b) (2015) (same).
219. See supra Section I.B.
220. See, e.g., People v. Houthoofd, 790 N.W.2d 315, 330 (Mich. 2010) (“[L]ack of proper
venue is subject to a harmless error analysis.”); State v. Blankenship, 170 S.W.3d 676, 682 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2005) (“[F]ailure to prove venue does not negate the guilt of the defendant.”).
221. About Us, OFF. OF THE SPECIAL NARCOTICS PROSECUTOR FOR N.Y.C., https://www.
snpnyc.org/about-us [perma.cc/6XGK-NJE5].
222. Id.
223. JOAN E. JACOBY, CARL B. HAMMOND, EDWARD C. RATLEDGE & STEPHEN W. WARD, ILL.
CRIM. JUST. INFO. AUTH., EVALUATION OF ILLINOIS’ MULTIJURISDICTIONAL DRUG PROSECUTION
PROGRAMS (1999), http://icjia.state.il.us/assets/pdf/researchreports/EvalMjdrug.pdf [perma.cc/
Q7TR-29J8] (cleaned up).
224. Howard A. Wise & Joe Williams, Jr., Using Enhanced Jurisdictional Laws to Prosecute
Multi-county Identity Thefts, 36 CDAA PROSECUTOR’S BRIEF 27 (2010).
225. See Barkow, supra note 187, at 550–70.
226. Id.
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spurred the creation of interjurisdictional prosecution offices. 227 As with special venue statutes, these innovations depart from the territoriality norm and
permit a measure of forum shopping in criminal prosecution. 228
Finally, and perhaps most important, the twentieth century witnessed the
rise of the plea bargain. The exponential growth of negotiated pleas is one of
the most documented and lamented features of the American criminal justice
system. 229 Today, plea bargains account for almost all criminal convictions in
the United States. 230 Professor John Langbein famously observed that this system “recapitulate[s] much of the doctrinal folly of the law of torture.” 231 Plea
bargaining also displaces the jury, which transforms vicinage into a rather
weak criminal procedure right. Ironically, given the Founders’ fixation on juries, the Constitution requires territoriality at the least important moment of
the modern criminal process.
These four developments—the splintering of jurisdiction and venue, the
proliferation of special venue rules, the creation of multijurisdictional prosecution units, and the plea-bargaining revolution—mean that even prosecution
is not as territorial as one would think. In the modern criminal justice system,
a court’s power to hear a case is different than where it may be heard. Legislatures can designate special places for criminal trials. Prosecutors can forum
shop. Venue defects are harmless errors. Plea bargains have largely undermined the relevance of the territorial limits on trials and juries. The cumulative result is a criminal justice system in which even prosecution, the lodestar
of constitutional criminal procedure, is less territorial than it used to be.
D. Punishment
Finally, there is punishment. The last phase of the criminal legal process
is the least tied to territorial boundaries. Take imprisonment, the most wellknown criminal sanction. American law does not require people to be imprisoned in the jurisdiction whose laws they violated, nor do prisoners need to be

227. See Terence Dunworth, Information Technology and the Criminal Justice System: An
Historical Overview, in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3, 5,
19 (April Pattavina ed., 2005). In some cases, the boundaries of state criminal jurisdiction also
expanded more formally. In 1942, for example, South Carolina abandoned a system in which
criminal prosecutors had countywide jurisdiction in favor of its current system, which gives
prosecutors multicountry jurisdiction. See S.C. CODE § 3869 (1912); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-251.1
(Supp. 1960); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-7-310 (Supp. 2022).
228. See Kalt, supra note 217, at 274 (denouncing buffer statutes for “reward[ing] forum
shopping by prosecutors”).
229. See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH (2003); Daniel Epps, Adversarial Asymmetry in the Criminal Process, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762 (2016); Jennifer L. Mnookin,
Uncertain Bargains: The Rise of Plea Bargaining in America, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1721 (2005) (reviewing FISHER, supra).
230. Stephen B. Bright, The Failure to Achieve Fairness: Race and Poverty Continue to Influence Who Dies, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 23, 24 (2008) (“[T]he overwhelming majority of criminal
cases—90% to 95%—are resolved with plea bargains.”).
231. John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 17 (1978).
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held near the site of their crime. 232 Prison officials may send federal prisoners
across the country, no matter where they were convicted. State prisoners can
also be transferred, sometimes thousands of miles, to serve their sentence in
another state’s prisons. 233 And noncitizens convicted in American courts can
be repatriated to their country of origin—so a Massachusetts or Texas prison
sentence can lead to prison time in Australia or Germany. 234
My previous research has explored the history of these prisoner transfer
systems. As that work explains, the prison was originally conceived in the late
eighteenth century as a territorial alternative to transportation punishment,
the reigning noncapital sanction at the time. 235 Early Americans believed imprisonment was a local and therefore more democratic alternative to transportation, a “monarchical” sanction used by “kings and despots.” 236 (One can
hear echoes of how the term “local” was used in early debates about criminal
jurisdiction here.)237 The first American prison systems were built on this
“positive republican theory of crime,” in which territorial punishment connected prisons to the polity that enacted criminal laws and promised to reintegrate prisoners into that polity upon release. 238
This philosophy of punishment ebbed with the rise of the administrative
state and the professionalization of a prison bureaucracy. 239 As prison systems
expanded in the 1940s and 1950s, state prison officials began to sign contracts
to share prisoners and prison bed space. 240 Those contracts turned into regional compacts and eventually a national prison network in which states can
send their prisoners across the country. 241 The Supreme Court upheld interstate punishment in 1983 when it ruled that prisoners have no due process
right to in-state confinement, even if prison transfers “involve[] long distances
and an ocean crossing.” 242 Thus, between 1930 and 1990, it became both normal and legal to punish prisoners far from the site of their crime.
International prisoner repatriation proceeded along a similar timeline. In
the mid-1970s, after high-profile news reports and congressional hearings on
the treatment of Americans imprisoned abroad, the United States entered its
first treaty for international prisoner transfers, a bilateral agreement with

232. See Emma Kaufman, The Prisoner Trade, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1815, 1823, 1856 (2020).
233. Id. at 1821, 1857.
234. Emma Kaufman, Extraterritorial Punishment, 20 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 66, 67 (2017).
235. Kaufman, supra note 232, at 1823, 1856.
236. Id. at 1823.
237. See supra Section I.B; infra Section III.B (connecting early American debates over the
“inherently local” nature of criminal law to a theory of criminal jurisdiction in which territorialism protects both sovereignty and democracy).
238. See REBECCA M. MCLENNAN, THE CRISIS OF IMPRISONMENT 19 (2008).
239. Kaufman, supra note 232, at 1826–27.
240. Id. at 1828.
241. Id. at 1828–29.
242. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 247 (1983).
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Mexico. 243 A series of other treaties followed, and by 1985 the United States
was a party to agreements providing for repatriation to and from sixty-seven
countries. 244 That number has since grown to more than one hundred. 245 Under the terms of these treaties, the United States can repatriate both federal
and state prisoners to serve prison sentences in their countries of origin. The
United States can also receive and “resentence” Americans convicted
abroad, 246 though in practice a treaty regime born for that purpose is used
mainly to export noncitizens out of the country. 247
Interestingly, the systems for both interstate and international prison
transfers are underused. 248 Prisoners are outsourced less than the law would
permit—a testament to the durability of the territoriality norm. 249 But the
emergence of prisoner transfer systems represents a notable shift away from
the belief that punishment has to be local to be lawful or democratic. Over the
course of the twentieth century, courts and prison bureaucrats concluded that
punishment need not be connected to the place where criminal law is made.
By now, the arc of this narrative should feel predictable. The history of
American imprisonment parallels the deterritorialization of policing and
prosecution, with glimmers of interjurisdictional cooperation in the early
twentieth century giving way to more systematic coordination by the 1970s.
In each of these contexts, increased mobility and state capacity put pressure
on the territoriality principle and encouraged more creative—which is to say
extraterritorial—forms of criminal law enforcement.

243. Kaufman, supra note 234, at 70.
244. Id. at 71.
245. Id.
246. American citizens repatriated to the United States are resentenced by the United
States Parole Commission “as though [they] were convicted in a United States district court of a
similar offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4106A(b)(1)(A). This process undermines the conventional story
about the separation of powers in which judges impose prison sentences. See Kaufman, supra
note 234, at 74.
247. Kaufman, supra note 234, at 78–79 (describing how repatriation “transformed into a
vehicle for prisoner exportation” in the mid-1990s).
248. This is a descriptive claim about government actors’ uptake of legal transfer regimes,
not a normative assertion that more prisoners should be transferred. See id. at 67–68 (explaining
that repatriation is “remarkably rare” neither because prisoners wish to stay in the United States
nor because the law prevents transfers, but rather because prison bureaucrats deny transfer applications on the ground that prisoners are either “too American” or committed a crime too
serious to license punishment abroad); Kaufman, supra note 232, at 1842, 1861 (noting that the
overall number of interstate prisoner transfers is small relative to the total American prison population and connecting this trend to political and financial incentives to keep prisoners in state).
249. Resistance to prison transfers reflects both the lingering territoriality norm in American criminal law and entrenched political dynamics—including bureaucratic turf wars and concerns about prisoners’ proximity to family—that lead to in-state punishment. See Kaufman,
supra note 232, at 1863. These political dynamics keep imprisonment loosely territorial even as
American courts have given up on the territoriality principle as a necessary basis for punishment.
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Once again, moreover, the Due Process Clause was no real impediment
to the expansion of criminal law. 250 The Supreme Court has never policed the
location of prisons, and the Court explicitly declined to constitutionalize
prison placement in the early 1980s. 251 As a result, constitutional law imposes
very few limits on where prisoners may be held. American prison officials can
move prisoners all over the country (in some cases all over the world), and the
site of a crime is barely related to where punishment occurs. Instead, personal
facts about a prisoner—his sentence length, disciplinary record, family’s location, citizenship status—determine where he will be confined. 252 This is a legal
regime that has long since given up on the idea that punishment must be local
to be legitimate.
E. Post-Territorial Criminal Law
In the end, then, every stage of criminal law has been deterritorialized.
This transformation has been uneven. Some parts of criminal procedure, such
as jury trials, remain more territorial than others. If asked to rank the system
by its commitment to borders, the right response is probably that criminalization is the most territorial phase of American criminal law, followed by
prosecution, policing, and then punishment. To be even more granular: legislative jurisdiction is slightly more territorial than judicial jurisdiction; both are
a bit more territorial than prosecution; and prosecution has clearer geographic
limits than either policing or punishment, which are deeply discretionary. But
these are differences in degree rather than kind. At every point in the process
of making and applying domestic criminal law, the territoriality principle has
declined.
This observation should be surprising. In thinking about when American
criminal law is territorial, one might expect to discover a disconnect between
criminalization and criminal law enforcement—that is, a system in which legislatures define crimes with territorial borders in mind and courts understand
their jurisdiction in territorial terms, but police and prison officials go rogue
when implementing legal rules. On this account, the deterritorialization of
criminal law would be an enforcement pathology. This story would be consistent with the view that criminal law “on the books” always looks different
than criminal law “in action,” particularly in a country where courts afford
law enforcers so much latitude. 253
Alternatively, one could imagine a criminal legal system that was territorial before conviction but unconcerned about the location of punishment. In

250. See supra notes 142–143 and accompanying text.
251. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 247–48 (1983).
252. See Kaufman, supra note 232; Kaufman, supra note 106.
253. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Jumping Bunnies and Legal Rules: The Organizational Sociologist and the Legal Scholar Should Be Friends, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 246,
246–47 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017).
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such a system, policing and prosecution would be territorial, but imprisonment would not be. This system would line up with the prominent (though
not uncontested) theory that criminal procedure rights exist to protect the innocent. 254 On this account, territorial policing and prosecution would be a
mechanism for providing fair and accurate criminal adjudication, and deterritorialized punishment would simply reflect the Constitution’s fixation on
innocence. This version of criminal law would also accord with the basic thesis
of the sociology of punishment, which is that “criminal law and punishment
are distinct social and cultural practices.” 255 For both the constitutional theorist and the sociologist, it would not be especially remarkable to discover that
punishment looks different from pre-conviction criminal justice.
Given the stories we tell about criminal law, it would make sense if deterritorialization were the product of unruly officers or a general disregard for
the convicted. If these molds fit, the conclusion would be that criminal law is
territorial, notwithstanding some predictable nuance. Yet neither of these two
models captures the current legal system. In reality, criminal law is more disjointed: it is sometimes territorial, sometimes predicated on alternative ideas
like citizenship or abstract state interests, and most territorial at the parts of
the criminal process that matter the least. It strains credulity to call this an
essentially territorial legal regime. In fact, American criminal law is split between territorialism and a different theory of state power in which criminal
law applies to a state’s members and interests wherever they go.
Recall, for instance, that after Skiriotes state criminal laws can follow citizens outside state territory; that the separation of venue and jurisdiction enables both prosecutors and defendants to move criminal trials; that local police
forces can pool their powers across state lines; and that state prison officials
can trade prisoners and rent prison beds in another state. 256 These are formal,
legal instances of deterritorialized criminal law, not aberrations or pathologies
so much as evidence of a post-territorial legal regime that has been warped
over time by new rules and enforcement practices. Over the course of the
twentieth century, tectonic social shifts—increased mobility, the birth of a
criminal enforcement bureaucracy, the rise of interstate compacts, a turn to

254. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 154 (1997)
(“[The] commonsensical point, I submit, is the essence of our Constitution’s rules about criminal procedure, and so I shall repeat it: the Constitution seeks to protect the innocent.”). But see
Louis Michael Seidman, Akhil Amar and the (Premature?) Demise of Criminal Procedure Liberalism, 107 YALE L.J. 2281, 2282 (1998) (reviewing AMAR, supra) (critiquing Amar’s argument
for “a general reorientation of criminal procedure toward factual guilt and innocence”).
255. LINDSAY FARMER, MAKING THE MODERN CRIMINAL LAW 21 (2016) (citing David
Garland for this proposition); see also DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY
19 (1990) (“Like architecture or diet or clothing or table manners, punishment has an instrumental purpose, but also a culture style and an historical tradition . . . .”).
256. See supra Section II.A (discussing Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941)); Section II.B
(interjurisdictional policing); Section II.C (venue’s transformation into a waivable right and
prosecutorial forum-shopping); Section II.D (interstate punishment).

396

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 121:353

private contracting—changed the character of criminal justice and made territorialism seem cumbersome and antiquated. These social developments
have produced a legal system that is home to several competing ideas about
the source and outer limits of the power to enact criminal law.
III. THE STAKES OF TERRITORIALISM
We are left with a conflicted criminal justice system. On one hand, the
territoriality principle is entrenched in constitutional law and institutional design. On the other hand, the borders of criminal law have faded in clarity and
import. Over time, both the substance and the enforcement of domestic criminal law have become less territorial: more regional, more discretionary, and
more flexible about permissible forms of jurisdiction. Our state-based criminal justice system is decreasingly tethered to state soil. And criminal courts
have long since abandoned nineteenth-century ideas about the limits of their
authority.
These developments lead to some concrete conclusions. As the Introduction noted, the emergence of the modern criminal legal system—with its contractual, overlapping boundaries—embarrasses constitutional doctrines
premised on the inherent localness of criminal law. The doctrines discussed
in Part I look outdated and contrived in light of Part II. Meanwhile, the rise of
task forces and ad hoc enforcement agreements demands more transparency
about the reach of criminal laws. People subject to law enforcement ought to
know which laws govern them, which police can detain them, what practices
their taxes are funding, and which criminal prosecutions can be brought in
their name.
This Part focuses, though, on the deeper implications of territoriality’s
decline. It explores two observations. First, the evolution of criminal jurisdiction makes it more difficult to explain why criminal law is distinctive and thus
why we have special rules for criminal law administration. The more one examines the territoriality principle, the more one wonders why Massachusetts
can’t enforce Nevada’s criminal code. Second, the erosion of territorialism
raises normative questions about whether borders—and, in particular, state
borders—are good for criminal law. This Part considers that question and
concludes with a cautious call to revive the territoriality principle as a strategy
for criminal justice reform.
A. Distinguishing Criminal Law
Part II described a legal regime shaped by private agreements—contracts,
compacts, MOUs—that alter the boundaries of criminal law. This is not the
criminal legal system of ideal theory, in which the power to enact criminal law
depends on the consent of a polity with clearly defined, stable borders. 257 Instead, we live in a system of private ordering in which government officials
257. See R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 36–39 (Michael
Tonry & Norval Morris, eds., 2001) (discussing liberal theories of punishment); FARMER, supra
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negotiate the scope of criminal laws, often behind closed doors. 258 This system
developed over the course of the twentieth century as mobility and technology
undermined territorial rules, encouraged more relaxed conceptions of criminal jurisdiction, and demanded flexible institutional arrangements.
In many respects, this system’s birth is a familiar story. The account of
criminal law outlined in Part II lines up with the standard narrative of legal
development in other disciplines, such as civil procedure and conflict of laws.
In those fields, it is not at all shocking to say: “This body of law changed
around the middle of the twentieth century, as social pressure to modernize
and privatize made territorial boundaries seem antiquated and generated new,
less formalist theories of law.” This statement broadly describes the trajectory
of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence 259 and the rejection of territorial approaches to choice of law in the 1950s. 260
Indeed, the transformations of civil and criminal law occurred along
strikingly similar timelines. The Supreme Court decided International Shoe
Co. v. Washington 261—the case credited with unmooring civil jurisdiction
from territoriality 262—just four years after Skiriotes, 263 the sponge-fishing case
that recast criminal law. This timeline suggests that the Court was engineering
dramatic shifts in both civil and criminal jurisdiction in the middle of the
twentieth century. Yet only the civil story has received extended treatment in
legal scholarship. Scholars who study procedure and conflicts—that is, aca-

note 255, at 27 (critiquing ideal theories of criminal law); Nicola Lacey, Approaching or Re-thinking the Realm of Criminal Law?, 14 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 307, 313 (2020) (discussing the place of ideal
theory in philosophy of criminal law). See generally DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES (1989).
258. In this respect, American criminal law looks more like a body of private contract law
than a subfield of public law. Cf. FLETCHER, supra note 128, at 190–91 (“[A]s a general matter,
Americans are a bit easy about the conceptual differences between private law and criminal
law.”). Fletcher distinguishes this American approach from German criminal law, in which private law notions such as vicarious liability are “anathema to the criminal law.” Id. at 191.
259. Danielle Keats Citron, Minimum Contacts in a Borderless World: Voice over Internet
Protocol and the Coming Implosion of Personal Jurisdiction Theory, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1481,
1504–07 (2006) (describing how “[t]he twentieth century’s sea change in transportation and
communication technologies” resulted in International Shoe); see BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK,
TONI M. MASSARO, NORMAN W. SPAULDING & MYRIAM GILLES, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND
PROBLEMS 113 (7th ed. 2021) (“International Shoe . . . cut [personal jurisdiction] analysis loose
from the mooring of territoriality and set it upon the uncharted sea of ‘minimum contacts.’ ”).
Recent Supreme Court decisions on personal jurisdiction have led scholars to identify—and in
most but not all cases, decry—a return to territorialism in civil procedure jurisprudence. See
Hoffheimer, supra note 31; cf. Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249
(2017).
260. See BRILMAYER ET AL., supra note 27, at xxiv (tracing the decline of territorialism in
choice of law theory); Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357, 360–61 (1992) (same); Laycock, supra note 31, at 317 (defending territorialism).
261. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
262. See sources cited supra note 259.
263. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
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demics who study the civil side of American law—widely recognize and routinely debate the decline of territorialism. 264 Criminal law scholars, by contrast, write very little about territoriality.
But as Part I made clear, territorialism is meant to be one of the field’s
core attributes. Everyone from the drafters of the Model Penal Code to constitutional theorists identifies the territoriality principle as a “maxim of . . . jurisprudence” that distinguishes domestic criminal law. 265 And the Supreme
Court treats the territoriality of criminal law as an implicit and longstanding
rule. 266 In Bigelow v. Virginia, a First Amendment case that invalidated the
conviction of a Virginia newspaper editor who printed an advertisement for a
New York abortion clinic, the Court deemed it “obvious” that Virginia could
not proscribe abortions in New York or prosecute its residents for going
there. 267 For this obvious proposition, the Court cited Huntington v. Attrill, an
1892 case in which it had observed that penal laws are territorial because
crimes offend “the public justice of the state.” 268
In all of these accounts, territorialism is what makes criminal law identifiable as a distinct genre of public law. Territorialism is also what makes domestic criminal law real law. As Professors Jack Goldsmith and Daryl
Levinson have observed, American legal scholars tend to treat domestic law
as real and concrete, by contrast to the purportedly unstable and unenforceable world of international law, where legal rules inevitably devolve into power
relations. 269 In this framework, domestic law is taken to be the “paradigm”
version of law, while international law is a “lesser species of law—if it qualifies
as law at all.” 270 To extend Goldsmith and Levinson’s argument, domestic
criminal law is supposed to be the paradigm sort of law, with clear rules,
boundaries, and sources of authority. It belongs in the category of “real” law
because of its dedication to the territoriality principle, which, as I noted at the
outset, is a shorthand for the idea that a government’s power to enact criminal
law stems from and stops at its borders.
The territoriality principle is thus central to how scholars conceptualize
criminal law. It is what divides domestic from international criminal law. It is

264. For the conflicts debate, see sources cited supra note 260. For a summary of the civil
procedure debate, see Hoffheimer, supra note 31.
265. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 explanatory note (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft
1962); see supra notes 12–18 (collecting sources that make this claim).
266. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822–25 (1975).
267. Id. at 823–24 (1975). Interestingly, Justices Rehnquist and White dissented, arguing
that the majority’s “rigid and unthinking territorial limitation” on Virginia’s power flew in the
face of precedents like Strassheim and Skiriotes and had no clear “constitutional source.” Id. at
834 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As this dissent suggests, the Supreme Court’s presumption
that criminal law is territorial “is quite at war” with the cases explored in Part II. Id.
268. 146 U.S. 657, 674 (1892); see infra note 278 (discussing Huntington); see also Note,
The Extraterritorial Operation of Penal Statutes, 1 VA. L. REV. 390 (1914).
269. Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional
Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1792–93 (2009).
270. Id. at 1793.
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what distinguishes criminal from civil law. It is what makes domestic criminal
law into the sort of content that belongs in a first-year legal curriculum rather
than some upper-level seminar on the limits of sovereignty. But as Part II
demonstrated, domestic criminal law is much less territorial than it seems at
first pass. Modern criminal law is riddled with exceptions to the territoriality
principle: criminal laws that follow Florida citizens into the Gulf of Mexico;
prosecutorial forum shopping; regional police task forces; a prison system that
pays no attention to the place a person is convicted. 271 The list goes on, and as
these exceptions stack up, domestic criminal law starts to seem much less
committed to the principle that allegedly defines it.
My claim is not that American criminal law is completely or even mostly
deterritorialized. Criminal law is often territorial. Rather, the point is that even
“normal” criminal law is less tied to territory than one would expect given that
territoriality is supposed to be what makes this body of law normal. In reality,
states and localities cooperate with each other, domestic criminal law is split
between competing theories of jurisdiction, and the criminal justice system is
so thoroughly saturated with discretion that territorial borders can be ignored
by both law enforcers and courts. As a result, state criminal law is just as unsettled and prone to power dynamics as “lesser” bodies of law, 272 and its justification and scope are just as contested. When all is said and done, domestic
criminal law is not all that territorial—which means it is not all that distinctive, either.
It would take a separate article to explore the full implications of the observation that criminal law is not distinctive. The big, underlying thesis here
is that the principle that divides criminal law from civil law, and domestic law
from international law, has eroded over the last century such that these conceptual divisions no longer withstand scrutiny. This thesis is unnerving given
how much rides on the distinction between criminal and civil law. Our basic
legal infrastructure (not to mention the entire constitutional rights regime) is
predicated on the idea that criminal and civil law are meaningfully different.
The harshness of criminal sanctions is also supposed to be justified by the distinctiveness of criminal law. The decline of territorialism puts real pressure on
these claims.
Waning territorialism also prompts questions about why criminal law operates differently than other fields. For instance, if domestic and international
criminal law are not especially distinct, why can’t states (like nations) criminalize their residents’ out-of-state behavior? What is wrong with a Texas statute that prevents a Texas resident from gambling in Las Vegas? What stops
Alabama from criminalizing its citizens’ conduct in California? To those immersed in Anglo-American criminal law and American constitutionalism,
these sorts of statutes feel intuitively problematic—imperial, dismissive of tradition, and threatening to national unity. That intuition may be right and
worth solidifying in legal doctrine. But as the law stands, it is not clear whether
271.
272.

See supra Part II.
Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 269, at 1792–93.
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or why these statutes would be unlawful, aside from the “long-held maxim”
that criminal law doesn’t work that way. That maxim looks precarious after
Part II. It is hard to argue that state criminal law must be territorial when state
legislatures, courts, police, prosecutors, and prison officials all routinely act
beyond state boundary lines.
In a similar vein, one might ask why courts continue to cite and endorse
the prohibition on interstate enforcement of penal laws. If criminal and civil
law are not particularly distinct, why is there no choice of criminal law? Why
can’t California authorize Texas to apply its criminal code? What would be
wrong with a legal system where Ohio courts imposed Pennsylvania’s criminal
law? And what, exactly, is the difference between that system and one where
Ohio can police and imprison Pennsylvania’s criminals?
The goal is not to answer these questions so much as to bring foundational
puzzles about criminal law into view by pointing out that the territoriality
principle, which is supposed to be defining, has receded. The territoriality
principle undergirds the intellectual framework of public law. It separates disciplines like international and domestic criminal law, and it drives unusual
features of the criminal legal system, such as the practice of extradition, the
presumption against extraterritorial state criminal laws, and the prohibition
on shared enforcement of criminal codes. All of these practices look stranger
and less defensible once one recognizes that borders are no longer sacrosanct,
not even in state criminal law.
B. Taming Criminal Law
The question that follows is whether borders are desirable. The decline of
the territoriality principle raises the possibility of a more flexible, less territorial criminal justice system. Part II demonstrated that government officials
have long been expanding and redrawing the boundaries of criminal jurisdiction. That history suggests that one could get even more creative about the
scope of criminal laws. Or perhaps the deterritorialization of criminal law is
an unwelcome development. To know how to think about this issue, one has
to start by asking what purpose borders serve in American criminal law.
1.

The Failure of Borders

There were three justifications for territorialism lurking in the doctrines
surveyed in Part I. First, the territoriality principle was supposed to protect
criminal defendants. This theory appeared in the Model Penal Code, which
explains that geographic limits on criminal prosecution “ensure . . . []fairness
to the defendant.” 273 The defendant-protective understanding of territorialism also featured in early constitutional debates over venue and vicinage. 274

273.
1962).
274.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 explanatory note (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft
See supra Section I.B.
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There, the claim was that territorialism would benefit defendants by keeping
trials close to home, which would guarantee access to counsel and sympathetic
juries. 275 The basic belief animating this theory of the territoriality principle is
that borders temper the harshness of criminal law. Territorialism limits state
power, which protects those subject to coercive state force.
Second, the territoriality principle was supposed to instantiate sovereignty. By marking out the place where governments can enact and enforce
their criminal laws, borders are meant to preserve a right to self-determination
and nonencroachment, which in turn ensures comity between (allegedly distinct and independent) states. We saw this version of territorialism at work in
the interstate extradition process 276 and in the constitutional cases that relied
on claims about criminal law’s localness to limit federal power over states. 277
In those examples, keeping criminal law within territorial boundaries was a
way to show that state governments are real and deserve respect. The basic
belief animating this conception of territorialism is that the power to enforce
criminal law is what makes a state a state.
Third, the territoriality principle was supposed to legitimate criminal law.
In theory, the reason it is problematic for Texas courts to apply Florida criminal law, or for Massachusetts police to arrest a Vermonter in Vermont, is that
criminal law is authorized by a democratic process in a certain state. Accordingly, the theory goes, it is illegitimate to apply the criminal laws of that state
to people who had no say in their creation. This is the understanding of territoriality that explains the penal law taboo 278 and the rule that in criminal law,
“jurisdiction and choice of law . . . are merged.” 279 It is also the theory behind
the claim that crime is an offense against “the public justice of the [s]tate” 280

275. See supra Section I.B.
276. See supra Section I.B.
277. See supra Section I.D (discussing Commerce Clause, abstention, and habeas cases that
rely on the “inherent localness” of criminal law to limit congressional power over states and
federal judicial power over state criminal courts).
278. See supra Section I.A (describing the prohibition against interstate enforcement of
penal laws). This “incontrovertible maxim” comes from Chief Justice Marshall’s statement about
the law of nations in The Antelope, the first case in which the Supreme Court considered (and
upheld) the international slave trade. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122–23 (1825) (“[I]t
is almost superfluous to say in this Court [that] . . . [t]he Courts of no country execute the penal
laws of another.”); see also Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 666 (1892) (considering “the true
scope and meaning of [this] fundamental maxim of international law”). As noted above, the
MPC adopts this maxim and converts it into a principle of domestic criminal law. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 1.03 explanatory note (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) (“[I]t has long
been a maxim of American jurisprudence that a state will not enforce the penal laws of another
state.”). The Supreme Court has followed suit. See Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224, 228–29 (1970)
(citing Huntington for the proposition that “the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require
that sister States”—here California and North Carolina—enforce each other’s “foreign penal
judgment[s]”).
279. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 explanatory note (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft
1962).
280. Huntington, 146 U.S. at 674.
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rather than any private citizen—which is why criminal prosecutors act on behalf of “the people” and criminal cases have captions like State v. Guthrie. 281
The basic belief animating this conception of territorialism is that criminal
law is an especially public sort of law, which requires an especially tight connection between the law and the people. Borders provide that link.
To summarize, the territoriality principle is supposed to protect defendants, safeguard sovereignty, and sustain a connection between criminal law
and democracy. The problem is that territorialism is not doing particularly
well on any of these fronts.
As Part II showed, borders rarely protect criminal defendants. In modern
criminal law, police and prison officials pool their powers across boundary
lines; courts decline to enforce territorial jurisdictional limits because they
“benefit[] only the criminals hidden in their shadows”; 282 and plea bargaining
has diminished the relevance of geographic restrictions on criminal adjudication. Moreover, as Part I noted, territorialism was never meant to protect defendants, at least not primarily. Despite the Model Penal Code’s insistence that
the territoriality principle exists to provide fairness to defendants, 283 it was actually a particular, now-outdated theory of criminal jurisdiction that motivated the Venue Clause. 284 The Founders could have required trials to be held
close to a defendant’s home; instead, they tied venue to the site of the crime.
This history reveals a simple but critical lesson: territorialism might help defendants, but it does so only incidentally and only when courts are willing to
enforce borders against the government. In a system where officials can contract around territorial rules and courts treat them as needless formalisms, the
borders of criminal law fail to protect those accused of crimes.
Borders seem to bear a closer relationship to sovereignty. In the current
criminal justice system, states get to make their own criminal laws; state criminal courts refuse to apply sister states’ “foreign” criminal codes; and the Supreme Court cites variation among state criminal laws and procedures as
evidence that states enjoy self-determination. These examples suggest that
borders are fairly effective surrogates for the concept of sovereignty. But the
idea that states are distinct and autonomous would not disappear if criminal
law were less territorial. Arguably, sovereignty is enhanced when a state can
criminalize out-of-state acts and contract with other jurisdictions to enforce
its criminal code. (No one thinks Germany is not a country because its criminal code travels with its citizens, and its police support INTERPOL.) 285 Surely
one of the main lessons of Part II is that states have expanded their power by

281. 461 S.E.2d 163 (W. Va. 1995); see Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “the People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 250–51 (2019).
282. Commonwealth v. Merchant, 595 A.2d 1135, 1139 (Pa. 1991).
283. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 explanatory note (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft
1962).
284. See supra Section I.B.
285. See Dubber, supra note 28 (discussing German criminal jurisdiction).
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ignoring and relaxing territorial rules. From this perspective, territorialism inhibits sovereignty.
The issue here is that “sovereignty” is a slippery term. State sovereignty is
not a thing that exists before police arrest people in the government’s name.
It is an idea that is constituted by those arrests. Jurisdiction flows from the
exercise of power, not the other way around. 286 So it is slightly strange to say
that sovereignty demands strict territorial borders. Moreover, it is never quite
clear what sovereignty means. Professor Don Herzog recently denounced the
concept as “obsolete, confused, and pernicious,” a word that either means “actor with jurisdiction” or “state,” or functions as a “vacuous adjective suitable
for trotting out on formal occasions.” 287 Others have tried to redefine sovereignty to keep up with “modern day reality” in which governments cooperate
and bargain with each other. 288 Some academics think the idea of state sovereignty is outmoded; others believe the concept still has value. 289 One need not
resolve this ongoing debate to appreciate that sovereignty and soil are not the
same thing. Borders often stand in for the idea that a government has a coherent identity and legal authority. But the mere existence of extraterritorial statutes and choice of law rules does not decimate the state.
Finally, with respect to democracy, is it not at all clear why criminal law
has to be territorial to reflect the will of the people. The best version of the
democracy-based argument for territorialism is the public law theory outlined
above: the criminal code is the pronouncement of a polity, which is defined
by legal borders. Territorialism keeps laws contained within those borders and
thus forges a link between criminal law and “the people.” There is something
attractive about this theory. The idea that crime is a public harm runs deep in
American legal culture, so it makes sense to try to line criminal law up with
the geographic unit that represents the public.
But it takes an idealized vision of the polity to get this theory off the
ground. As recent debates over community policing and “democratizing”
criminal law have shown, 290 legally defined government units may not be the
best representation of collective will about how criminal law should work.
Certainly, state lines do not always capture the relevant boundaries of a political community. In any event, even if state borders do reflect “the public,” it
remains unclear why it would be undemocratic for democratically elected

286. See Ford, supra note 24, at 847. See generally ABLAVSKY, supra note 77; LAUREN
BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY (2010); LISA FORD, SETTLER SOVEREIGNTY (2010).
287. DON HERZOG, SOVEREIGNTY, RIP, at ix–xii (2020); see also Gregory Ablavsky, Empire
States: The Coming of Dual Federalism, 128 YALE L.J. 1792, 1797 & n.11 (2019) (collecting the
literature “lament[ing] sovereignty as hopelessly imprecise”).
288. See Bridget A. Fahey, Federalism by Contract, 129 YALE L.J. 2326, 2411–12 (2020)
(collecting this literature).
289. See Gillian E. Metzger, The States as National Agents, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1071, 1073
(2015) (“I don’t think we can really get rid of the concepts of state autonomy and state sovereignty quite as much as [Professor Heather] Gerken wishes.”).
290. See John Rappaport, Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87 U. CHI.
L. REV. 711 (2020) (summarizing the democratization literature).
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state legislatures to allow their neighbors to apply their criminal laws. Nor is
it apparent why a citizenship-based system of criminal law would be undemocratic—after all, one could argue that citizenship is a better marker of membership in a polity than physical presence on a piece of land. 291
Ultimately, then, the territoriality principle is not a particularly good
proxy for the values it is meant to serve. Territorialism is supposed to protect
defendants, sovereignty, and democracy. But borders fail to shield criminal
defendants in practice. States don’t lose their autonomy when they cooperate.
And it takes a series of artificial assumptions to conclude that democracy requires criminal law to be territorial.
These observations reveal some new possibilities for criminal justice reform. If territorialism is declining and the theoretical defenses of the territoriality principle are weak, one might wonder whether we should develop an
even less territorial criminal legal regime. Imagine, for a moment, a version of
criminal law built around a capacious conception of legislative jurisdiction
and a robust conflicts jurisprudence in which courts evaluated a variety of factors—facts about the crime, the defendant, and the policy interests at stake—
to determine which criminal law to apply in a given case. Consider a criminal
justice system in which Rhode Island judges interpreted Indiana’s criminal
laws and applied Indiana’s sentencing rules. Or a system with even looser
venue requirements, in which criminal defendants could move to combine
multiple cases in a single proceeding or transfer their cases to a “foreign” court
in the name of convenience. These reforms, which amount to permitting a
degree of forum shopping by criminal defendants, might provide a check on
excessive prosecutorial discretion, which scholars widely agree is one of the
American criminal justice system’s main defects. 292
To take the idea even further, imagine regionalizing criminal lawmaking
to better reflect the groups most affected by criminal law enforcement. If the
borders of criminal law are constructed and negotiable, why not have “the
criminal law of Chicagoland”? Or the criminal law of Chicago’s South Side?
Lest one protest that these proposals are outlandish, recall from Part II that
Indiana and Illinois have created police task forces for the express purpose of
overcoming territorial jurisdictional limits, and states already join compacts
to harmonize their criminal laws. 293 (One might also note that, given uneven
policing, we effectively do have different criminal law in different neighborhoods.) 294 It is worth asking why redistricting criminal law is unthinkable
when legislatures use legal fictions to criminalize extraterritorial acts, courts
can adjudicate cases involving out-of-state conduct, police can ignore territorial boundaries, and state prison officials can outsource their prisoners.

291. E.g., Ferzan, supra note 14, at 336.
292. See, e.g., RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS 143 (2019) (“Meaningful
institutional reform must begin with changing the way prosecutors operate.”).
293. See supra Section II.B.
294. See generally JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN (2017); ELIZABETH
HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME (2016).
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These are different sorts of proposals. Some reconsider which borders to
use in criminal law, while others reject territorialism altogether. The preceding pages have shown both that domestic criminal law contains nonterritorial
theories of jurisdiction and that the American criminal justice system is less
state-based than doctrine and dogma would suggest. In other words, criminal
law need not be territorial, and, where it is, it need not rely on state lines. One
could build from either insight to advance criminal justice reform.
2.

The Promise of Borders

But perhaps it is unwise to hasten territoriality’s decline. There are some
real virtues to a criminal justice system with clear geographic boundaries.
Think, for instance, about the upsides of a legal regime built around state borders. Allowing state governments to make their own criminal laws—and then
requiring those laws to stay within state lines—constrains criminal law imperialism. In a territorial legal system, Texas cannot prevent its residents from
getting abortions in New York. 295 Given a right to travel between states and
the means to do so, 296 this approach to criminal law protects individual liberty.
It also protects New Yorkers insofar as they have different policy views on
abortion than Texans and have chosen to live in a state whose laws enshrine
those views. To use the language of public choice, the territoriality principle
minimizes the negative externalities of a government’s decisions about how to
define and police crime.
For the same reasons, territorialism promotes policy variation, particularly around whether certain conduct should be criminal at all. Although there
is widespread agreement that some acts are crimes—murder is the classic example here—that consensus disappears when it comes to contested topics like
low-level drug crimes and immigration offenses. There is even wider debate
about the appropriate punishments for these crimes. 297 The territoriality principle means that Kansas and Colorado can disagree about marijuana, and a
Kansan can go to Colorado to try out a different criminal code.
On some level, these are just the standard reasons to like federalism. 298
These arguments are not unique to criminal law, but they are especially compelling in a field where legal rules have moral overtones, policy disagreements

295. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824 (1975). A restriction on out-of-state abortion
should be impermissible in any event. Scholars have argued persuasively that a standard conflicts
analysis leads to the conclusion that states cannot prevent out-of-state abortions. E.g., Brilmayer,
supra note 148; Kreimer, supra note 148. Others have explored a range of constitutional doctrines that might protect the right to choice. See supra note 149. The point here is simply that
criminalizing extraterritorial abortion would be impermissible, without question, in a territorial
criminal law regime.
296. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
297. See, e.g., FORMAN, supra note 294; Gabriel J. Chin, Illegal Entry as Crime, Deportation
as Punishment: Immigration Status and the Criminal Process, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1417 (2011).
298. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1566–
67 (2012).
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are sharp, and sanctions are harsh. We should be most concerned about promoting policy variation and the ability to vote with one’s feet when the stakes
of law are at their apex.
There are also more fundamental reasons to like territorialism in criminal
law, whether or not it tracks state lines. As Part I noted, predicating criminal
law on territory is a relatively egalitarian way to decide who is subject to criminal liability. 299 This Article began by observing that the key jurisdictional
question in a territorial legal regime is where something happened rather than
who committed or suffered a harm. As a result, territorial criminal law is agnostic about identity and status. Questions like whether an alleged criminal is
a U.S. citizen or a legal resident are irrelevant in a territorial criminal law regime. And potential victims are protected by virtue of their presence, no matter when they arrived or how long they plan to stay.
Of course, territorialism is only relatively egalitarian. Territory is not apolitical; borders are laced with the history of colonialism and oppression. 300 To
the extent that a criminal legal regime relies on borders, it reifies that history.
But there is no uncontested way to define membership for the purpose of
criminal law, and we need some way to decide when criminal law applies and
whom it protects. The most common alternative to physical presence is citizenship status. 301 That alternative—a regime in which the criminal code applies to citizens and travels with them—is far more status conscious and far
less egalitarian than a system built around the territoriality principle, and it
raises thorny questions about the government’s authority to subject noncitizens to criminal laws. 302 In short, in a society where citizenship status is racialized and everyone deserves the law’s protection, geography may be the
least problematic metric for criminal law.
Finally, and most hopefully, territorialism could be a tool to curb abuses
in the criminal justice system. Part II did not offer much cause for optimism
about borders; it portrayed a legal system in which the territoriality principle
rarely constrains the police power. But one has to wonder if territorialism
could be more effective. In tracing the decline of the territoriality principle,
Part II offered a roadmap for using borders to reform criminal law. Consider
all the ways territoriality has been undermined and all the ways it might be
revived. Courts could reinvigorate the Due Process Clause to prohibit extraterritorial arrests and restrict extraterritorial punishment. 303 They could read
the Extradition Clause to permit states to police each other’s criminal justice
299. See Ford, supra note 24, at 890–91 (noting that the American conception of territorial
jurisdiction was designed to promote egalitarianism and was in this respect central to the project
of “political liberalism”).
300. See, e.g., FORD, supra note 286; Ablavsky, supra note 287, at 1824–27, 1856–61; Ford,
supra note 24, at 868–72, 888–95.
301. See, e.g., RYNGAERT, supra note 45, at 104–10; Dubber, supra note 28, at 250; Perkins,
supra note 46.
302. See Yaffe, supra note 18; Zedner, supra note 12.
303. See Kaufman, supra note 234 (defending a presumption that states should confine the
prisoners they convict).
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systems. They could use any number of different constitutional provisions to
narrow the conditions under which states can criminalize out-of-state conduct. At the very least, government officials could interpret the due process
guarantee to require transparency and public deliberation about the permissible reach of domestic criminal laws.
These reforms would restore some balance to the territorialism in American criminal law. At present, the territoriality principle is asymmetric: state
governments invoke territorialism to justify their power to make and enforce
criminal laws, but the principle does little to temper that power. Criminal law
would be more fair—more coherent and restrained—if the territoriality principle worked both ways. Imagine if the territoriality principle not only authorized Tennessee to make criminal laws but also prohibited Tennessee police
from arresting people in Georgia. Consider a version of territorialism that permitted Hawaii to punish people but then prevented Hawaii from outsourcing
its prisoners to Kentucky. In this account of criminal law, territorialism licenses and limits state power. Borders are both the fount of government authority and a restraint on officials’ discretion. Academics frequently argue that
criminal law enforcers have too much discretion. 304 Perhaps one problem is
that the territoriality principle is underenforced.
The intuition driving these suggestions is that formalism is beneficial in
criminal law. These days, it can be strange to call for more formalism in any
area of law. The realist turn in the American legal academy over the past halfcentury has made formalist arguments seem old-fashioned and slightly tonedeaf. 305 In other branches of public law, including constitutional and administrative law, formalism is often critiqued as insincere and undue. 306 But informality is uniquely destructive in the criminal legal system. 307 American
criminal justice is dominated by ad hoc arrangements, loose administration,
and unfettered discretion. In this context, formalism—even stilted and “hopelessly arbitrary”308 constraints like state lines—is ameliorative.
Indeed, territorial boundaries might be just the sort of structural limits
that could discipline American criminal justice. In other fields, scholars and
reformers have turned to structural concepts to advance egalitarian aims. In

304. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Criminal Municipal Courts, 134 HARV. L. REV. 964,
1041–43 (2021) (“[I]nformality poses special dangers to criminal adjudication. . . . [F]ormalism
and the legality principle with all their imperfections still play an outsized role in regulating substantive justice . . . .”).
305. See Emma Kaufman, The New Legal Liberalism, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 198–203
(2019) (reviewing JUSTIN DRIVER, THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE (2018)) (discussing the rise and
impact of legal realism).
306. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Foreword: 1930s Redux:
The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 36 n.215 (2017). See generally Cass
R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636 (1999).
307. See Natapoff, supra note 304, at 1041–42.
308. Ford, supra note 24, at 850 (“The boundaries that define territorial jurisdictions are a
legal paradox because they are both absolutely compelling and hopelessly arbitrary.”).

408

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 121:353

immigration law, for instance, advocates have made preemption and commandeering claims to protect immigrants’ rights when equal protection law
has proven inadequate to the task. 309 Critics of the American criminal justice
system might make a similar move, looking to the territoriality principle to
constrain criminal law imperialism and law enforcement excess where arguments based on equality, liberty, and criminal procedure rights have failed.
My own inclination is toward this latter path—toward embracing territorialism as a means to regulate domestic criminal law. But I may be on the
wrong side of history. The modern criminal justice system may simply be too
functional, too contractual, and too interdependent to revive old ideas about
criminal jurisdiction. That is certainly one conclusion to draw from Part II.
For those who seek to tame the harshness of American criminal justice, there
may be more mileage in abandoning or redrawing the boundaries of criminal
law than in enforcing them. The real point is that all of this is possible. The
territoriality principle is a norm, not a rule. And the uncritical assumption
that criminal law has to be territorial has obscured some interesting and open
questions about the future of the field.
CONCLUSION
Territorialism is an organizing principle in domestic criminal law. The
presumption that a government’s power to criminalize and punish conduct
stems from its authority over some piece of land dates to the founding. But
over time, that presumption has weakened and warped in ways that raise
foundational questions about the scope and legitimacy of American criminal
law. The basic terrain of criminal law has shifted. In response, we have to ask
why borders matter and whether we can sustain a criminal legal system without a clear sense of the source and limits of state power.

309. See Kaufman, supra note 106, at 1387 (describing the effort to use structural concepts
to protect immigrants’ rights in debates over, among other things, sanctuary cities and the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program). See generally Hiroshi Motomura, The
Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional
Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992).

